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Following two long wars conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan, the American appetite for 
large-scale and prolonged stability operations may be diminishing. Consequently, 
employment of United States Special Operations Forces (SOF) may prove an 
increasingly attractive alternative for the Department of Defense (DOD) in unstable 
regions because of its unique capability to operate indirectly and with a minimal 
footprint, particularly in responding to cases of State failure, which is closely tied to 
outbreaks of conflict between governments and armed insurgents. Hence, the appropriate 
employment of SOF will be of critical importance to the achievement of U.S.-led efforts’ 
goals-one of which is building partner nation capacity to mitigate causes of conflict or to 
prevent conflicts from escalating to cause complete state failure. 
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The United States is unlikely to repeat another Iraq or Afghanistan—that 
is, forced regime change followed by nation building under fire—anytime 
soon. But that does not mean it may not face similar challenges in a 
variety of locales. Where possible, U.S. strategy is to employ indirect 
approaches—primarily through building the capacity of partner 
governments and their security forces—to prevent festering problems from 
turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct military 
intervention. In this kind of effort, the capabilities of the United States’ 
allies and partners may be as important as its own, and building their 
capacity is arguably as important as, if not more so than, the fighting the 
United States does itself.1   
—Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, January 2009 
Accordingly, U.S. forces will retain and continue to refine the lessons 
learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been developed 
over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. However, U.S. forces will no longer be sized to 
conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.2  
—Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities 
 for 21st Century Defense 2012 
A. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE 
In an era of persistent conflict, with weak and failing states throughout the world, 
the Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) has become more relevant to the United States’ national 
interests and security.  The significance of stabilizing specific failing states for U.S. 
strategic interests is clear.  Failing states may afford terrorist groups sanctuaries, from 
which they can train and launch attacks.  These states may also offer a large pool of 
potential recruits, because of unemployment, few economic opportunities and political 
grievances.  Moreover, weak states, which possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 
are of even greater threat to the U.S, as WMD can fall into the hands of these terrorist 
organizations.  Somalia, Syria, and Pakistan are examples of countries that demonstrate 
                                                 
1 Robert Gates, “Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs, 
January 2009.   
2 U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense 
2012 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), 6. 
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some of these characteristics.  Thus, if left unchecked or unmitigated, failing states may 
evolve to pose direct and indirect threats to U.S. national interests and security. 
Following two long wars conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan, the American 
appetite for large-scale and prolonged stability operations may be diminishing. 
Consequently, employment of United States Special Operations Forces (SOF) may prove 
an increasingly attractive alternative for the Department of Defense (DOD) in unstable 
regions, because of its unique capability to operate indirectly and with a minimal 
footprint. Particularly in responding to cases of State failure, which is closely tied to 
outbreaks of conflict between governments and armed insurgents. Hence, the appropriate 
employment of SOF will be of critical importance to the achievement of U.S.-led efforts’ 
goals-one of which is building partner nation capacity to mitigate causes of conflict or to 
prevent conflicts from escalating to cause complete state failure.   
The purpose of this thesis is to identify how SOF capabilities can be effectively 
employed in order to mitigate conflict in failing and weak states. Understanding how to 
employ SOF for mitigating conflict in failing states can potentially garner numerous 
benefits for both the U.S. and the assisted country. For instance, the U.S. will be better 
prepared to assist South Korea’s special operations forces to prepare for a possible 
collapse of the North Korean regime and internal armed conflict that may ensue 
following the regime collapse. In a similar light, the U.S. will be better prepared to cope 
with regional crises, such as Mali insurgency. 
B. THE PROBLEM (RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS) 
1. Research Question 
How should SOF be employed in order to stabilize failing states or unstable 
regions by mitigating conflict?   
2. Hypothesis 
In order to answer the research question, we hypothesize that the effectiveness of 
SOF capabilities at reducing conflict in failing states is dependent on three variables: 
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SOF employment must address immediate causes of conflict; SOF employment must be 
SOF-centric; and interagency cooperation must be coordinated by SOF.   
3. Independent Variables  
These three independent variables were developed from personal experience, 
doctrine, documented historical examples, and academic analysis.     
a. SOF Employment Must Address Immediate Causes of Conflict  
SOF capabilities, specifically, Civil Affairs (CA), Military Information 
Support Operations (MISO) and Special Forces (SF), are more effective if they are 
applied to immediate causes of conflict rather than fundamental causes of conflict. SOF 
capabilities are better suited to address immediate causes of conflict, as immediate causes 
are less complex and easier to address than fundamental causes of conflict. Fundamental 
causes of conflict are deep rooted problems that cannot be influenced effectively by SOF 
capabilities, but rather require host nation direct engagement. Both causes of conflict will 
be addressed in further detail in Chapter II. 
b. SOF Employment Must be SOF-Centric 
We define SOF-centric employment as the employment of U.S. forces in 
failing states with the aim of maintaining an indirect, host nation led, small footprint, flat 
organization, with a largely non-kinetic operational focus. SOF-centric employment of 
U.S. forces will be less invasive, less costly, and more flexible with the main focus 
towards enabling the host nation populace and host nation government. SOF-centric 
employment does not only apply to SOF units. General purpose forces may use a SOF-
centric approach if they are employed to maintain an indirect, host nation led, small 
footprint, flat organization, and largely non-kinetic operational focus. 
c. Interagency Cooperation Must Be Coordinated by SOF 
Often United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA), and other Department of State (DOS) organizations have the means and 
resources to provide assistance to host nation institutions when conducting nation 
building.  However, they sometimes lack the access to denied or semi-permissive areas, 
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and lack the understanding of the operational environment, to include specific culture, 
values, and political hierarchy.  As of late, the U.S. military has acted as the link that 
connects these organizations to the host nation government.  For instance, Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRT) were established to promote regional development at the 
provincial level in Iraq.  The PRT’s effort can be characterized as localized economic 
engagement efforts that contributed to regional stability.  However, these provincial 
developmental projects have often become too big and too slow.  As a result, these 
projects become irrelevant and wasteful by the time they are completed.  For example, in 
2009, PRT in Iraq purchased $300,000 worth of tractors to benefit local agricultural 
programs without fully integrating local sheikhs and tribal leaders input.  As a result, the 
tractors were not delivered on time as promised and when they were delivered they 
caused more problems because it only benefited select few sheikhs and their village.3 
Alternatively, SOF’s organizational structure is better suited for 
interagency cooperation.  By working with interagency organizations SOF elements link 
a balance between the centralized and local host nation authorities by bolstering 
traditional governance mechanisms.  For example, in Afghanistan, Village Support 
Coordination Centers (VSCC) integrate interagency involvement into select district and 
provincial areas, which is facilitated by SOF and directly ties interagency efforts to host 
nation authority.4  Additionally, SOF’s organizational structure matches the core 
functions expected of a state which are political, security, social welfare and economic 
functions and will be discussed in further detail in Chapter II.  When combined together, 
SF, CA, and MISO address these core functions.  For instance, SF is focused on 
enhancing security, through the employment of Foreign Internal Defense (FID).  CA is 
focused on civil assistance to enhance social welfare and economic stability.  MISO is 
focused on influencing the host nation populace to support its own government for 
political stability.  Thus, if interagency cooperation is coordinated by SOF, greater 
success for stability is likely achieved.   
                                                 
3 Blake Stone, “Blind Ambition: Lessons Learned and Not Learned in an Embedded PRT” PRISM 1, 
no. 4 (December 2012): 147–158.  
4 Robert Hulslander, and Jake Spivey, “Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police” PRISM 
3, no. 3 (June 2012): 125–138.  
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4. Dependent Variable 
To what extent SOF employment was effective at fostering stability in a studied 
area is the dependent variable in our argument.  It is extremely difficult to measure the 
effectiveness of SOF employment in a given area.  However, one of the most effective 
measures to be used in determining this can be to assess the security function or the 
change in the level of conflict where SOF capabilities were employed.  Therefore, a 
standard indicator of effectiveness will be measured by violent terrorist acts, or 
significant activities (SIGACTs) occurring in each region.  This approach does not 
address the other areas of government functions: politics, welfare, and economic.  
However, these functions are not possible in the absence of security.  Therefore, the 
increase or decrease in number of SIGACTs can function as an indicator for conflict in a 
given area, and by extension, can determine the overall effectiveness of SOF 
employment.    
C. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis begins with identifying fundamental causes and immediate causes of 
conflict within each case study.  Identifying fundamental causes and their effect on 
stability will allow us to analyze how these fundamental causes impact immediate causes 
of conflict.  In turn, identifying immediate causes of conflict and their effect on stability 
will help us analyze how immediate causes fuel insurgent movements that destabilize 
each country or region.  Once both fundamental and immediate causes and their impact 
on stability have been determined, we will examine each hypothesis to determine how 
effectively SOF capabilities were employed within each case study.  It is significant to 
distinguish the difference between fundamental and immediate causes of conflict.  We 
will argue that SOF is less likely to have an impact on the fundamental causes and is 
more likely to mitigate immediate causes of conflict.  By differentiating the two causes, 
military planners can then address the causes most relevant to SOF employment.  This 
concept will be addressed in further detail in Chapter II. 
We will conduct three case studies where SOF employment has been most 
extensive, most current, and still ongoing: Philippines, Colombia and Afghanistan.  A 
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couple of caveats should be addressed for data fidelity. For each case study, empirical 
data specific to SOF employment is limited and can be biased in how the data is 
interpreted.  Also, when empirical data is available, it encompasses the employment of a 
whole U.S. or Coalition effort.  For example, the Global Terror Database has data 
regarding terrorist activities occurring in Afghanistan, and it does not address specific 
instances where SOF units were directly involved.  As a result, a general statistic could 
show that violent acts have decreased in a given region, but it does not reflect whether or 
not it was the result of SOF employment.  Therefore, we will focus our study on reports 
addressing SOF employment, illustrating a change in violent activity for a given area, to 
demonstrate the difference SOF made in that region.  Another difficulty identified is the 
ability to measure the effectiveness of SOF based on data collected through the 
employment FID, Civil Military Operations (CMO) and Information Operations (IO), and 
the results of which were conducted indirectly through host nation forces.  Results of 
operations conducted indirectly through host nation forces can be biased.  Where 
possible, we will collect data where SOF employment did not occur to contrast with areas 
where SOF was employed.  
Each country studied demonstrates whether the employment of SOF did, or did 
not have, an impact on the level of conflict.  The case studies show varying degrees of 
enduring SOF presence and sustained engagement, reflecting diverse SOF employment in 
each country.  For example, the employment of U.S. forces in the Philippines was largely 
an exclusive SOF effort.  Employment of U.S. forces in Colombia was conducted with a 
mixture of conventional and SOF units, and in Afghanistan SOF employment initially 
began with SOF as the primary effort.  However, following the introduction of 
conventional forces into theater, they became the primary effort, and SOF became the 
supporting effort in Afghanistan.  A weakness of these case studies is that there are too 
many variables to assess to understand the overall impact on the level of conflict.  
However, by analyzing the number of SIGACTs which occur where SOF have been, and 
have not been employed, we can determine whether SOF did, or did not, make a 
difference in the level of conflict in each area studied.  
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D. RELEVANT LITERATURE 
This thesis primarily synthesizes two broad bodies of knowledge.  We review the 
literature on failed states in order to identify both fundamental and immediate causes of 
conflict for the cases.  In addition, we examine key indicators of failing states.  Some of 
the main texts which help to build our basis for research on failing and weak states 
include: Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security by 
Stewart Patrick and When States Fail by Robert Rotberg.  From these works, we identify 
that there are several definitions of weak and failing states. The literature illuminates 
recurring core functions expected of a state by the people, which similarly appear within 
each failed state index.  They are generally security, rule of law, political freedom, and 
civil services. However, prevalent failed state indicators are not always consistent among 
the various studies of failed states, as the focus and purpose of indicators varies from 
index to index.  As a result, within the prevalent literature on failed states, there exists no 
comprehensive index that we can use to determine the applicability of SOF in weak or 
failing states.  However, Stewart Patrick outlines variables most applicable to our 
research question.  These core functions are Political, Social Welfare, Security, and 
Economic.5  Our primary sources for SOF employment are DOD doctrine and case study 
specific professional journals and articles.    
  
                                                 
5 Stewart Patrick, Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 28–30. 
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II. METHODOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND DEFINITIONS  
This chapter provides the basic framework that guides the analysis of the thesis. It 
will discuss the definitions of Special Operations Forces (SOF) and failing state doctrine 
as it applies to the thesis.  The subject of stabilizing failing states has been studied by 
many scholars.  When combined with the employment of SOF in these states, it becomes 
an even more complex matter.  Translating scholarly terminology and applying it to 
military terminology presents a unique challenge when addressing the employment of 
SOF elements sent to resolve or mitigate identified causes of conflict.   
A. FAILED, WEAK, AND FAILING STATES 
As we are concerned about SOF employment in failing states to reduce violence, 
it is crucial to understand what a failing state is.  Numerous definitions for failed and 
weak states exist. To simplify understanding the difference, we adopt Stewart Patrick’s 
definition for a failing state: “A state that struggles to fulfill the fundamental [basic] 
security, political, economic, and social functions that have come to be associated with 
sovereign statehood.”6 Patrick identifies four core functions of a state, which shows a 
more balanced and transparent index than other indices.  We adopt these four core 
functions, listed in detail below, to assist us in identifying fundamental and immediate 
causes of conflict. When these core functions are not provided, conflict ensues.  Reducing 
conflict does not undo state failure but can create the conditions in which the host nation 
can improve its core functions.  
 Political.  The extent to which a state “rules in a legitimate, capable, and 
responsive manner through accountable, effective, and representative 
institutions.”7  
 Security.  The extent to which a state “provides security for its citizens and 
sovereignty for its territory.”8 
                                                 
6 Stewart Patrick, Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 30.  
7 Ibid., 28.  
8 Patrick, Weak Links, 28.  
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 Social Welfare.  The extent to which a government “meets the basic 
human needs of its citizens.” Expected by the people of each region at the 
institutional level through the establishment of key infrastructure, such as 
schools and medical facilities and delivery of services such as electricity, 
water and sanitation.  People’s expectation on the level of social welfare 
function the government provide may differ by country and culture.  For 
example, where a water and sanitation system is important to someone 
from the Philippines, it may not be as important to someone from 
Afghanistan.9 
 Economic.  The extent to which a government “provides citizens with a 
stable macroeconomic, fiscal, and regulatory environment that is 
conducive to growth.”10  
B. STATE STABILITY  
The core functions listed above directly impact the stability of a state.  We define 
state stability as the ability of a state to carry out these core functions.  A failing state 
does not need to fail at providing all of these functions, because the security function 
influences other core functions heavily.  A state with less security is more prone to failure 
because of the greater instability that exists with increased violent conflict.  However, a 
high of level of violence does not suggest a state is not successful at providing the 
security function.  For example, one could argue that the level of violence in the United 
States is relatively high.  However, the U.S. is considered to be a relatively stable 
country.  In the same vein, perspectives and tolerance levels of violence may differ, based 
on culture and country.  Thus, by measuring the level of security function and assessing 
how it impacts the other core functions affecting overall state stability we make a 
determination of the level of state stability.11  The greater a state’s ability to provide more 
of the core functions to the population, the greater the state stability.  Conversely, a lack 
of these functions provided by the state demonstrates an occurrence of state instability, 
which is likely to manifest itself in greater violence.   
                                                 
9 World Food Programme, Philippines: Violent Conflict and Displacement in Central Mindanao, 
Challenges for Recovery and Development, (Rome: World Food Programme, 2011), 61. 
10 Patrick, Weak Links, 30. 
11 Robert Rotberg, When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2004), 4. 
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C. FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES AND IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF CONFLICT  
A fundamental cause is the root reason for conflict.  An immediate cause has its 
origin in a fundamental cause, and can be traced back to this fundamental cause.  See 
Figure 1 below.  In other words, a fundamental cause is deep rooted, complex and has 
generational impacts on long-term stability, while immediate causes are relatively new, 
less complex, and when presented on their own, stem from a fundamental cause.  It is 
very difficult to distinguish fundamental and immediate causes of conflict in general, 
because each state is unique and has its own history, culture, and societal norms that must 
be accounted for when identifying each cause.  Also, identification of cause of conflict 
can be subjective according to those in the state as well as outside observers.  Therefore, 
for each case study, we have drawn upon the expertise of authors who have studied each 
case.  Based on relevant literature, we have selected causes of conflict, and have 
determined fundamental and immediate causes by tracing each cause to its root.  If a 
cause can be traced back to a preceding cause, and if the cause was relatively new and 
less complex, then we determined this as an immediate cause.  If a cause could not be 
traced back to another cause, and had generational impacts on stability, then we 
determined this to be a fundamental cause.  
 
Figure 1.  Tracing Immediate Cause and Fundamental Cause of Conflict 
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D. DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESIS 
The development of the three independent variables in our study begin with 
reviewing relevant literature on intervention and stability operations, current government 
and academic studies on post conflict operations, and our own experience as SOF 
officers. The purpose of this section is to give the reader an understanding how we have 
developed the independent variables and why.    
E. THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
1. SOF Employment Must Address Immediate Causes of Conflict 
This variable is predicated upon the assumption that U.S. military capabilities 
should not and cannot be employed to fix fundamental or structural problems of failing 
states such as ethnic grievances, resource depletion, and systemic economic and political 
instability.  However, well-coordinated and supported SOF capabilities can be employed 
as remedy for more immediate causes such as warring factions and weakened governance 
capacity.  Alternatively, SOF capabilities would be ineffective when addressing the 
fundamental causes, such as resource depletion, rapid macro-economic degradation, and 
politicized ethnic diversity as such problems are beyond the scope and capacity of SOF.   
2. SOF Employment Must Be SOF-Centric 
This thesis defines characteristics of SOF-centric employment to be an indirect 
approach, host nation led, flat organization, small footprint, and generally non-kinetic 
operations.  This variable was developed based on the idea of minimalist stabilization, 
which promotes the concept that military intervention should be indirect, un-intrusive, 
and have greater host nation involvement (both civic and military).12  Also, we adopt the 
flat organization model of Mintzberg as part of our SOF-centric approach.  Mintzberg 
states a flat, or “horizontal” organization has the following characteristics: flexible with 
more autonomy, less bureaucratic, which encourages out of box solutions for problems, 
and has a less formal communication structure, with more frequent face-to-face 
                                                 
12 Stephen Watts, Caroline Baxter, Molly Dunigan, and Christopher Rizzi, The Uses and Limits of 
Small-Scale Military Interventions (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), 8. 
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interaction.13  Although, SOF organizations are military organizations which are 
hierarchical organizations in nature, in their execution, they often assume a flatter 
organizational structure, giving greater flexibility to respond to highly complex and 
unstable environments, such as in failing states.  Also, this variable captures the concept 
that a failing state has a better chance of long-term stability with less direct involvement 
by an external entity, as opposed to external support with short-term stability through 
direct intervention.  Additionally, conventional force-centric operations tend to be 
invasive as they require a large support footprint in order to sustain their operations.  
They require a greater number of service members serving in the General Purpose Forces 
(GPF) who often lack the maturity and knowledge to engage the local population.  
Another characteristic of the SOF-centric approach is that when SOF is employed, it 
should be small enough to allow for greater flexibility and not to be misinterpreted as an 
occupying force.  SOF capabilities must be employed in an indirect manner, by, with and 
through, the host nation forces.  The host nation forces must lead operations in order to 
give the partner government a great degree of perceived political leadership and 
legitimacy.  SOF capabilities must be focused more on non-kinetic operations, versus 
kinetic operations conducted by both host nation and U.S. in order to minimize 
unnecessary damage to the population. Last, unilateral operations should be avoided by 
U.S. forces when possible in order to minimize targeted insurgent or terrorist information 
operations campaigns against the U.S.   
3. Interagency Cooperation Must Be Coordinated by SOF 
This variable is mainly informed by our own experiences as SOF operators that 
SOF units are most effective when operating in a joint capacity with other governmental 
agencies.  Also, SOF’s unique organization, capabilities, and regional expertise create the 
most suitable environment for interagency cooperation.  GPF battalions and brigades 
have nation building capabilities similar to SOF’s.  However, these capabilities are not 
organic to the conventional unit.  At the operational and tactical unit level, GPF 
capabilities lack the specialized training, experience and existing interoperability 
                                                 
13 Henry Mintzberg. “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?” Harvard Business Review 59, no. 1 
(1981): 8. 
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structure with the interagency when incorporating interagency resources into theater.  
Alternatively, Civil Affairs (CA), Military Information Support Operations (MISO), and 
Special Forces (SF) which are organic to SOF, and respectively correspond to political, 
security, social welfare, and economic aspect of nation building.  Regional and cultural 
proficiency and expertise due to persistent engagement with host nation enable SOF 
capabilities to be more effective in identifying immediate causes of conflict and 
organizing solutions to address causes of conflict.  This enables higher rate of return on 
resources spent and minimizes inefficient use of resources.  Thus, SOF can be the center 
of an interagency effort that directs and coordinates stability operations efforts from the 
tactical to strategic levels.  
F. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) DOCTRINE AND DEFINITIONS  
Military doctrine is a guide which standardizes operations under a common frame 
of reference across the military.   We provide core SF, CA, and MISO doctrine here in 
order to provide the common frame of reference in which SOF operate under in order to 
reduce violence and level of conflict in failing states.    
1. Defining SOF Core Operations 
Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-05 (ADRP 3-05) for Special Operations 
defines SOF Core Operations as, “military missions for which SOF have unique modes of 
employment, tactical techniques, equipment, and training to orchestrate effects, often in 
concert with conventional forces.”14 See Figure 2.  We selected core operations which 
only pertain to assisting a host nation in reducing levels of conflict, through which that 
host nation can then address the core functions expected of a state.   These SOF core 
operations are Foreign Internal Defense, Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations and 
they are defined below.   
                                                 
14 U.S. Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publications 3-05 (ADRP 3-05): Special 
Operations (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 2012), 2-1. 
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Figure 2.   Special Operations Core Operations and Activities15 
Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and 
activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other 
instruments of national power. The five primary stability tasks are 
establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services, 
support to governance, and support to economic and infrastructure 
development. Stability operations are aimed at reducing threats from state 
fragility and instability. Long-term stability operations—consisting of 
low-profile SOF engagement conducted in concert with U.S., interagency, 
international, and HN partners—can mitigate the risk of lengthy post-
conflict interventions.16 
Foreign Internal Defense is participation by civilian and military 
agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another 
government or other designated organization to free and protect its society 
from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to 
its security (JP 3–22, Foreign Internal Defense). FID is an activity of IW 
and involves a comprehensive approach. The comprehensive approach 
includes all instruments of national power—diplomatic, information, 
military, and economic. FID is executed through unified action involving 
the synchronization, coordination, and integration of activities from 
governmental and nongovernmental entities within the operation to 
achieve unity of effort.17  
                                                 
15 U.S. Department of the Army, ADRP 3–05: Special Operations, 2-1. 
16 Ibid., 2-4.  
17 Ibid., 2-2. 
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Counterinsurgency is defined as comprehensive civilian and military 
efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances 
(JP 3–24, Counterinsurgency Operations). Successful COIN operations are 
population-focused because of the importance of building support for the 
government and its programs. Likewise, the population is a center of 
gravity for an insurgency and is targeted as part of an integrated COIN 
effort.18 
When assisting a host nation in reducing conflict, understanding above SOF core 
operations is crucial.  Stability Operations, FID, and COIN emphasize civilian and 
military cooperation and comprehensive approach which include all the instruments of 
national power: Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic.  Also, ADRP 3-05 
stresses the importance of interagency cooperation with SOF to assist a host nation in 
focusing its efforts towards the population, making the people of that country the center 
of gravity.  Moreover, similar to our four core functions expected of a state, Joint 
Publication 3-07 (JP3-07) Stability Operations identifies human security, economic and 
infrastructure development, and governance and rule of law as elements of stable state.  
JP 3-07 states that the stability of a state depends on how well these elements are 
performed.19  See Figure 3.  There are many conditions and factors that are needed to be 
considered in order to bring stability to a state.  Also, besides the above mentioned 
factors, other important factors are the forces who plan and execute these operations.  
According to JP 3-07, SOF’s unique capabilities make them the force of choice when it 
comes to conducting stability operations.20  These unique capabilities inherent to SOF are 
listed in further detail in the next section.  
                                                 
18 U.S. Department of the Army, ADRP 3–05: Special Operations, 2-3.  
19 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-07 (JP 3-07): Stability Operations (Washington 
DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), I-2. 
20 Ibid., I-15. 
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Figure 3.  Elements of a Stable State21 
2. Understanding Special Operation Forces and their missions 
To better understand how SOF capabilities can be employed to reduce violence 
and level of conflict in failing states, SOF capabilities, must be defined.   
a. Civil Affairs (CA) 
Field Manual 3-57 (FM 3-57) Civil Affairs Operations defines CA as, 
“designated Active and Reserve Components forces and units organized, trained, and 
equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military 
operations.”22  Civil Affairs Teams (CATs) are typically comprised of a team chief, team 
sergeant, medic and engineer.  CATs primary function is to engage the civil component at 
the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war.  They integrate military forces with 
civil authorities, including intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental 
                                                 
21 U.S. Department of Defense, JP 3-07: Stability Operations, I-3.   
22 U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-57 (FM 3-57): Civil Affairs Operations (Washington 
DC: Department of the Army, 2011), 1-1. 
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Organizations (NGOs) and the Indigenous Populations and Institutions (IPI) to modify 
behaviors, to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society, and to assist in establishing the 
capacity for deterring or defeating future civil threats to U.S. objectives.23  See Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.  Interrelationship of CAO, CMO and Full Spectrum Operations24 
CA has five Core Tasks, which are: populace and resources control, 
foreign humanitarian assistance, civil information management, nation assistance, and 
support to civil administration, and are listed in further detail below.25 
Populace and resources control (PRC). Populace control provides 
security for the populace, mobilizes human resources, denies enemy 
access to the population, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of 
enemy agents.26  
Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA). FHA are programs conducted 
to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other 
                                                 
23 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-57: Civil Affairs Operations, 1-1.  
24 Ibid., 1-3. 
25 Ibid., 1-3. 
26 Ibid., 3-2. 
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endemic conditions, such as human pain, disease, hunger, or need that 
might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to 
or loss of property. Normally, FHA includes humanitarian services and 
transportation; the provision of food, clothing, medicine, beds and 
bedding; temporary shelter and housing; the furnishing of medical 
materiel and medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to 
essential services.27  
Civil information management (CIM). CIM is the process whereby civil 
information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally 
fused with the supported element, higher HQ, and other USG and DOD 
agencies, IGOs, and NGOs. This process ensures the timely availability of 
information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw 
and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners 
throughout the AO.28 
Nation assistance (NA). NA is civil or military assistance (other than 
FHA) rendered to a nation by U.S. forces within that nation’s territory 
during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements 
mutually concluded between the United States and that nation. NA 
operations support a HN by promoting sustainable development and 
growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term 
regional stability.”29  
Support to civil administration (SCA). SCA are military operations that 
help to stabilize or to continue the operations of the governing body or 
civil structure of a foreign country, whether by assisting an established 
government or by establishing military authority over an occupied 
population.30 
A key point to understanding CA core tasks is that CA plays a critical role 
in stability operations.  Although its functions do not directly address the political and 
security functions related to a failing state, their non-kinetic operations are a powerful 
tool that addresses the social welfare and economic functions expected of a state.  CA 
conducts these core tasks through Civil Military Activities (CMA) or Civil Military 
Operations (CMO) and Civic Action Programs (CAP).  They are defined below.  
                                                 
27 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-57: Civil Affairs Operations, 3–6. 
28 Ibid., 3-10. 
29 Ibid., 2-13. 
30 Ibid., 3-17. 
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DENTCAP. Dental Civic Action Program; program aimed at providing 
dental treatment to a local populace of a foreign nation through the employment of 
dentists and dental technicians. 
ENCAP. Engineering Civic Action Program; program aimed at providing 
civil engineering projects in a foreign nation to improve infrastructure, such as clinics, 
and schools. 
MEDCAP. Medical Civic Action Program; program aimed at providing 
medical treatment to a local populace of a foreign nation through the employment of 
doctors and medics. 
MEDRETE. Medical Readiness Training Exercise  
VETCAP. Veterinarian Civic Action Program; program aimed at 
providing medical treatment to the animals belonging to a local populace of a foreign 
nation through the employment of veterinarians and technicians. 
SURGRETE. Surgical Readiness Training Exercise 
A review of CA’s activities, operations, and capabilities illustrates the vast 
range of problems it is expected to mitigate and demonstrates the importance of its 
existence.  CA’s role is crucial as it applies to the successful employment of SOF, 
because it enhances relationship between the population and the military. 
b. Military Information Support Operations (MISO) 
Military Information Support Operations (MISO) units, formerly known 
as PSYOP, are specially trained, equipped and organized to provide specialized support 
to commanders.  These operations are conducted across the strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels of war, and are also used as part of interagency activities to achieve U.S. 
national objectives.31  In respect to Special Operations, MISO is integral when employing 
SOF in areas experiencing conflict.  It supports various missions under Irregular 
                                                 
31 U.S. Department of the Army, ADRP 3-05: Special Operations, 2-6–2-7. 
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Warfare;32 however, for this thesis we will define MISO which pertains to FID, Stability 
Operations and COIN.   
FID. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) are used to promote the ability 
of the HN to defend itself against internal and external insurgencies and 
terrorism by fostering reliable military forces and encouraging empathy 
between HN armed forces and the civilian populace. PSYOP also may be 
used to modify the behavior of selected target audiences toward U.S. and 
multinational capabilities. The main objectives of PSYOP during FID are 
to build and maintain support for the host government while decreasing 
support for insurgents. 
Stability Operations. Successful execution of stability operations tasks 
depends on informing the local   populace and influencing attitudes to 
secure the trust and confidence of the population. PSYOP exerts 
significant influence on foreign target audiences (TA).  
COIN Operations. PSYOP can influence foreign populations through 
information to influence attitudes and behavior and to obtain compliance 
or noninterference with friendly joint operations. PSYOP can provide 
public information to support humanitarian activities, ease suffering, and 
restore or maintain civil order. PSYOP can serve as the supported 
commander’s voice to foreign populations by conveying the Joint Force 
Commander’s intent. 
Civil Affairs Operations (CAO). CAO are military operations conducted 
by civil affairs forces that enhance relationships between military forces 
and civil authorities through the application of functional specialty skills 
that normally are the responsibility of civil government. PSYOP can be 
integrated with CAO activities to increase support for the HN government 
and reduce support to destabilizing forces. PSYOP can publicize the 
existence and successes of CAO to enhance the positive perception of U.S. 
and HN actions in the AOR and trans-regionally. PSYOP inform and 
direct civilians concerning safety and welfare to reduce civilian casualties, 
suffering, and interference with military operations.  
                                                 
32 Irregular warfare (IW) is defined as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for 
legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, 
though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s 
power, influence, and will.” (JP 3-13.2)  Under IW, MISO conducts the following activities: “insurgency; 
counterinsurgency (COIN); unconventional warfare (UW); terrorism; CT; FID; stability, security, 
transition, and reconstruction operations; PSYOP; CMO; intelligence and counterintelligence activities; 
transnational criminal activities, including drug trafficking, illicit arms dealing, and illegal financial 
transactions, that support or sustain IW; and law enforcement activities focused on countering irregular 
adversaries.” (JP 3-13.2) 
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Most important aspect MISO is that it amplifies host nation government 
and military actions and successes in order to build local populace confidence in their 
government. Thus, reducing support for insurgent forces.   
c. Special Forces (SF) 
Special Forces is characterized as a highly adaptive, culturally experienced 
and a versatile organization, allowing it to conduct operations that have 
operational and strategic implications. Special Forces Soldiers plan and 
conduct special operations (SO) across the full range of military 
operations from unilateral direct action (DA) to joint interagency, 
intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) interaction…33   
 
Figure 5.  Special Forces Principal Tasks34 
As defined above, SF is a unique organization operating at all levels of 
war. This thesis will highlight specific SF principle tasks that are more closely associated 
with stability operations. These tasks include COIN, FID, and Security Force Assistance 
(SFA).   
COIN – defined previously 
FID – defined previously 
                                                 
33 U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-18 (FM 3-18): Special Forces Operations 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2012), 1-1. 
34 Ibid., 2-4.  
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Security Force Assistance (SFA) — The Department of Defense’s 
contribution to a unified action effort to support and augment the 
development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces 
(FSF) and their supporting institutions to facilitate the achievement of 
specific objectives shared by the U.S. Government.35 SFA and FID 
overlap without being subsets of each other36 
SF teams are the unit of choice when conducting low intensity operations; 
especially when carrying out the three principle tasks listed above.  SF generally has 
advanced training in variety of target languages, as well as an enhanced understanding for 
cultural awareness and regional expertise that conventional units often lack.  At the 
tactical level of operations, SF is organized typically as a 12 man team, and is designated 
a Special Forces Operational Detachment–Alpha, or SFODA.  Each SFODA is organized 
with SF Soldiers who are specially trained in planning, intelligence operations, weapons, 
engineering and demolition, advanced medical skills, radio, electronic, and 
telecommunications.  These groups of man are highly adaptable and can operate in 
austere condition.  Also, they can work in smaller groups, typically two to three man 
teams, to cater to specific mission requirements.  When compared to conventional forces, 
SFs ability to work closely with host nation security forces is crucial to stability 
operations that occur in highly complex and unstable environments, such as failing states.  
In summary, this chapter provided an overview of definitions, doctrine and 
tasks performed by SOF to give the reader a better understanding of SOF capabilities, 
and how they can be employed to mitigate conflict.  The full spectrum of SOF operations 
was not discussed because this thesis is focused on the employment of SOF to assist host 
nations with a stabilization effort.  When combining the complexity involved in 
stabilizing failing states with the employment of SOF, this chapter reviewed some of the 
essential information for the reader to understand when translating military terminology 
and applying it to scholarly terminology applied by academics.  
  
                                                 
35 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-22 (JP 3-22): Foreign Internal Defense 
(Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010), I-16.  
36 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-18: Special Forces Operations, 2-9.  
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III. PHILIPPINES CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States and the Republic of the Philippines (RP) have a relatively long 
relationship dating back to the 1890s when the U.S. formally colonized the Philippines 
(1902-1946) in the wake of the war with Spain in 1898.37  Since then, the Philippines has 
been vital to U.S. national interests and security in Southeast Asia.  In the first half of the 
20th century the Philippines emerged as central to America’s wider geopolitical and 
commercial push into Asia, despite the looming confrontation with an expansionist 
Imperial Japan’s ambition to dominate Asia.  Since World War II, the Philippines has 
served as a strategic base of operations for the U.S. military.  Today, the Philippines is 
even more vital to U.S. national interests and security as it serves as a recruitment base 
and training ground for al-Qaeda linked terrorist groups, such as the Abu Sayyaf Group 
(ASG) and the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).  Also, as China’s ambition and influence grows 
within Asia, the Philippines will play an even greater role in U.S. national interests and 
security.38  Therefore, the stability of the Philippines is a significant concern for the U.S., 
as the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) struggles with various 
insurgent groups that threaten the country’s stability and security through violent armed 
conflict.  These insurgents groups are the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) / 
New People’s Army (NPA), the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), ASG and the JI.39  In an effort to combat the threat of 
terrorism and armed conflict by ASG and JI, the GRP requested U.S. assistance.  
Consequently, the U.S. employed SOF in the Southern Philippines.  This case study is 
focused on the employment of SOF in the Philippines under Joint Special Operations 
Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF-P), in order to determine whether SOF capabilities 
have been effectively employed and whether SOF capabilities can mitigate causes of 
                                                 
37Thomas Lum., The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests, CRS Report RL33233 
(Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Research Service, January 3, 2011). 
38 We are primarily dealing with low-intensity conflict, not great power politics.  
39 Lum, The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests. 
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conflict which threaten Philippine stability.  We will briefly introduce the history of the 
Philippines in the 20th century.  Next, we will identify the fundamental and immediate 
causes of conflict.  Subsequently, the case study turns to a discussion of SOF 
employment in the Philippines and examines three variables to study how effectively 
SOF capabilities are used to mitigate the causes of conflict in the country.  The overall 
argument within this case study is that JSOTF-P has been employing SOF capabilities 
effectively to mitigate immediate causes of conflict through a SOF-centric methodology 
and effective interagency cooperation which is coordinated by JSOTF-P.   
B. BACKGROUND 
The complexity of the root causes of conflict in the Philippines can be illuminated 
by close examination of its modern history.  By examining the rise of two insurgent 
groups, the MNLF and CPP/NPA, the root causes of the conflict become more evident.  
With the introduction of Islam and Catholicism in the 16
th
 century, the people living on 
the islands that became the Philippines were divided into two religious groups, the 
Muslim Filipinos and the Christian Filipinos.  By the late1960s, the differences between 
these two groups had transformed into a full-fledged political and socio-economic 
repression of the Muslim minority.  The MNLF was created by the dissatisfied and 
marginalized Muslim Filipinos to seek an independent Muslim state separate from the 
RP.40  Since then, Philippine stability has suffered through persistent armed conflict and 
violence between the GRP and MNLF, and other secessionist groups such as the MILF 
and ASG.  Similarly, the CPP/NPA was created because of the differences that existed 
between the rich and the poor. Increasing socio-economic inequality and oppression of 
the poor by the political elites and the rich led to the Huk insurgency in 1947. The Huk 
Insurgency was quickly quelled by the GRP.  However, over the years, poor governance 
and rampant corruption have exacerbated the socio-economic inequality issue.  During 
the Marcos regime, the CPP/NPA established itself and gained strength on the issue of 
                                                 
40 Larry Niksch, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippines-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, CRS Report 
RL31265 (Washington DC: Library of Congress, Research Service, January 24, 2007).  
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socio-economic inequality.  Consequently, violent armed conflict ensued between the 
CPP/NPA and the GRP, which further increased conflict level in the Philippines.41    
C. FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES OF CONFLICT 
From the history of the Philippine insurgencies, this case study has determined 
that three broad fundamental causes of conflict have afflicted the Philippines: the 
religious divide between the Christian Filipinos and the Muslim Filipinos, socio-
economic inequality, and the culture of corruption.  These causes of conflict are deep 
rooted and have manifested themselves as many different immediate causes of conflict.  
First, the religious division, which separates the Christian and the Muslim Filipinos into 
two polities, mainly affects the issue of political and security functions.  For example, 
political repression and discrimination of the Muslims intensified when the newly 
established GRP encouraged Christian Filipinos to migrate to the Muslim Southern 
Philippines.  This migration diluted the Muslim population and reduced them to a 
minority.42   With the migration, also came the Public Lands Act which encroached on 
the Muslim right of ancestral lands in Mindanao, further antagonizing the Muslims.43  
This religious division has created deep hatred and distrust between the Christians and 
the Muslims, which has fueled the rise of Islamic secessionist movements led by the 
MNLF, MILF, and ASG.  Violent armed conflict between the Muslim insurgents and the 
GRP continues today.44   
Second, socio-economic inequality is another fundamental cause of conflict.  
According to the Gini coefficient,45 RP is ranked in the top 36 out of 136 countries in the 
world for its income inequality.46  (#1 represents the highest income inequality)  This 
                                                 
41 Lum, The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests.  
42 Daniel Joseph Ringuet, “The Continuation of Civil Unrest and Poverty in Mindanao,” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, no. 1 (April 2002): 38. 
43 Syed Serajul Islam, “The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand and Mindanao of 
the Philippines,” Asian Survey 38, no. 5 (May 1998): 445. 
44 Lum, The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests.  
45 Gini Coefficient is an internationally accepted measure of inequality of income.  It measures the 
degree of inequality in the distribution of family income in a country. 
46 “The World Factbook: The Philippines,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed March 17, 2013, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html. 
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fundamental cause is a combination of income inequality and social injustice.  The 
CPP/NPA cites this fundamental cause as the source of its existence.47  More 
importantly, socio-economic inequality renders large segments of the population 
susceptible to terrorist and insurgent narratives.48  For instance, during the Marcos 
regime, the CPP/NPA successfully exploited socio-inequality issue to radicalize people 
by offering social justice through land-reform and protection to the poor.49  As the 
influence of the CPP/NPA grew, the Marcos regime indiscriminately and brutally 
repressed the CPP/NPA under martial law.50  Armed violence between the CPP/NPA and 
the GRP intensified, further increasing level of conflict in the Philippines.51  Despite 
GRP efforts to defeat the insurgency, by 1981, it was reported that the CPP/NPA fighters 
had reached 10,000 strong and the CPP/NPA acted as an unofficial government in many 
areas of the Philippines.52  Presently, though the GRP has done much to alleviate poverty 
and close the socio-economic inequality gap, its efforts have been hampered by persistent 
armed conflict between insurgent groups and the GRP.  GRP’s inability to provide 
adequate security in rural areas, due to insurgent activities, has made poverty alleviation 
very difficult.  
Government corruption, the third fundamental cause of conflict, gives little 
chance for the poor to be heard.  The ignored, marginalized, and poverty stricken 
Filipinos became the target of exploitation and recruitment by the CPP/NPA, as well as 
other insurgent groups, such as ASG and JI.  Whether it is the use of public office for 
self-serving opportunities, or bribing a public official for illegitimate gains, the culture of 
corruption is rampant at all levels of the Philippine society.  The culture of corruption is 
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considered to be the number one concern of Filipinos, regardless of religious or class 
affiliations.53  Corruption diverts public resources from development of basic services 
and the economy.  Also, it erodes confidence and trust in government.54  Former 
president Marcos used state funds to reward his cronies and political allies during his 
rule.55  Also, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National 
Police (PNP) were used as tools of repression against opposition groups rather than a tool 
of justice.56  The assassination of Benigno Aquino, Marcos’s staunch opponent, stunted 
investment flow and brought investment confidence to a record low.57  More recently, 
former president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was arrested for the misuse of state lottery 
funds that were intended for development.58  Today, although the image of the AFP and 
the PNP has improved, some still view them as tools of repression and symbols of 
government corruption, which is detrimental to the GRP’s legitimacy, marginalizing its 
efforts to deal with terrorism and insurgent groups.59  
D. IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF CONFLICT 
There are numerous immediate causes of conflict which stem from the 
fundamental causes of conflict discussed above.  These immediate causes are categorized 
below based on four core functions expected of a state.  These immediate causes of 
conflict were more prevalent during the Marcos regime.  However, these immediate 
causes still exist today despite concerted GRP efforts.   
 Political: political repression, extrajudicial killing, political assassination 
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 Security: armed violence, weak rule of law, human rights violation 
 Social Welfare: lack of social services (such as medical services, potable 
water, and sanitation; underdevelopment of infrastructure, such as roads 
and schools) 
 Economic: lack of economic opportunities  
The immediate causes of conflict exacerbate the existing fundamental causes and 
insurgent activities.  Political repression, extrajudicial killing, political assassination, and 
human rights violations by the GRP fuel insurgent movements.  For instance, the 
extrajudicial killing of Muslim AFP recruits by the AFP, known as the Jabidah Massacre, 
was the underlying cause which sparked the Muslim insurgency.60  Similarly, political 
repression and heavy handed response by the Marcos regime to rising communist 
movements further radicalized the CPP/NPA in the early 1970’s.  Also, 40 years of failed 
counterinsurgency operations against multiple insurgencies, which have included human 
rights violations by the AFP, have eroded government legitimacy and undermined 
confidence in GRP’s ability to provide protection.61  Unprosecuted human rights 
violations committed by the AFP continue today62 and promote perceptions of corruption 
and failure in government and the rule of law.63  Along the same line, persistent armed 
violence and weak rule of law contribute to creating a cycle of conflict.  Due to heavy 
armed violence throughout the Philippines, the PNP’s primary function—to deal with 
internal security problems—was given to the AFP.64  Thus, the primacy of police and 
civilian rule was weakened due to prolonged and politicized military involvement in 
internal security problems.65  As a result, the GRP suffered over ten military coups 
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d’états from 1986 to 2006, which directly challenged civilian rule and the rule of law.66  
Armed violence in conflict affected areas disrupts the development of social welfare and 
economic functions.  For instance, in 2008, heavy fighting between the MILF and AFP 
over Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD), resulted in 610,000 
internally displaced persons.67  The armed violence such as above has been ongoing for 
over 40 years, destroying livelihood of Filipinos, further instigating social inequality 
gaps, and religious division.68  Needless to say, due to armed violence, social welfare 
infrastructure, such as roads, schools, medical facilities and potable water, and economic 
infrastructure, such as small market in rural areas and job opportunities, are 
underdeveloped in the conflict affected areas, compared to non-conflict affected area.  In 
turn, lack of economic and adequate social welfare functions encourage conflict as the 
local populace sees deterioration of these functions as “willful government neglect” 
based on religious discrimination, enhancing insurgent narrative.69   
In summary, these immediate causes have cascading impacts on the stability of 
the Philippines, as these causes continue to exacerbate the fundamental causes of conflict.  
The GRP, understanding the consequences of these immediate causes, has begun, in 
recent years, addressing them with the help of the U.S., and especially SOF.    
E. SOF CAPABILITIES EMPLOYED: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND 
ORGANIZATION 
In 2002, with the growing level of conflict in the Southern Philippines due to 
violent extremist groups such as ASG and JI, the GRP requested U.S. assistance in 
combating terrorism.  In response to this request, the U.S. chose SOF to assist the GRP.  
JSOTF-P, under Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines (OEF-P), deployed to lead 
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combat advise and assist operations in the Southern Philippines.70  Initially, its primary 
focus was on improving security functions of the AFP in the Southern Philippines.  
However, today, JSOTF-P’s capability is focused on all four core functions expected of a 
government.  This section will briefly describe the JSOTF-P mission, its organization and 
the capabilities of JSOTF-P employed.   
JSOTF-P Mission Statement: 
The Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines mission is to support 
the comprehensive approach of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 
their fight against terrorism and lawless elements in the southern 
Philippines and prevent terrorists from establishing safe havens. At the 
request of the Philippine government, JSOTF-P works alongside the AFP 
in a strictly non-combat role to defeat terrorists, eliminate safe havens and 
create the conditions necessary for peace, stability and prosperity in the 
Southern Philippines.71  
The above mission statement is the blue print for JSOTF-P’s employment of its 
SOF capabilities. Its focus is on indirect, host nation led, and comprehensive approaches 
to peace, stability and prosperity.    
Since its initial deployment, JSOTF-P has been comprised of about 600 personnel 
on any given day, for over ten years.72  It is organized into three regionally focused task 
forces which provide command and control to SOF units operating in the Southern 
Philippines.  These three task forces are Task Force Sulu (Sulu Archipelago), Task Force 
Archipelago (Basilan Island and Tawi Tawi Island) and Task Force Mindanao (Eastern 
Mindanao).73  Each task force is composed of Special Forces (SF) / Navy SEAL teams, 
Military Information Support Teams (MIST), Civil Affairs Teams (CAT), who are 
known as the Liaison Coordination Elements (LCE), alongside other vital enablers. These 
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SOF units are partnered with AFP units in their respective areas of operation, and are 
directly integrated with AFP partners in order to enhance AFP capabilities.74   
The SF teams’ main focus is to increase capacity of the AFP and police partners 
to combat terrorism.  These SF teams train and advise their partners from basic infantry 
skills to combined application of combat powers, to include non-kinetic capabilities.  
Together with these skills, the SF teams demonstrate the importance of human rights and 
rule of law during training and mission planning, emphasizing the legitimacy of the GRP 
and the supremacy of the rule of law.   
CAT mainly offers non-kinetic capabilities.  However, its capabilities are perhaps 
the most valuable assets that improve the social welfare and economic function in the 
conflict affected areas of the Southern Philippines.  CAT, SF teams and partnered AFP 
units conduct Civil Military Operations (CMO).  CMOs build small but vital 
infrastructure such as roads, schools, water wells, medical centers, and piers.  In addition, 
CMOs provide medical care to impoverished regions torn by poverty and armed violence, 
providing basic social services in areas where local government cannot.  These CMOs 
establish and reinforce the GRP and the local government’s legitimacy as these 
operations are carefully designed, planned and executed by the AFP with the help of 
SOF, specifically targeting terrorist safe havens.75  Improved road networks increase the 
accessibility of government forces in denied areas.  Also, education centers, wells, and 
medical centers become the hub for information flow where the GRP is able to promote 
government legitimacy and collect information on terrorist and lawless elements.76  To 
further bring relief to the immediate causes of conflict, CAT liaise and coordinate closely 
with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for the targeted 
and effective utilization of international resources at a provincial and district level, which 
is a long term solution to the causes of conflict.     
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MISO teams also offer non-kinetic capabilities that are directly informed by 
strategic objectives and offer comprehensive plans to address the psychological and 
political aspect of conflict.  MISO teams train and advise the AFP Psychological 
Operations units and conduct information operations through mass media such as public 
radio.  Often MISO teams organize community relations activities as CA and SF teams 
conduct CMOs.  MISO also produces pamphlets and comic books with anti-terrorist 
themes in order to dissuade the youth from developing an interest in joining terrorist 
organizations.77  Overall, MISO capability has an amplifying effect on CA and SF teams’ 
mission.  Through public broadcasts via radio, television, newspapers, and pamphlets, 
GRP’s efforts to provide and improve the four core functions for the livelihood of 
ordinary Filipinos are amplified in the Southern Philippines.  Thus, the legitimacy of the 
GRP and the local government is strengthened.   
F. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
1. SOF Employment Must Address Immediate Causes of Conflict 
 Political: political repression, extrajudicial killing, political assassination 
 Security: armed violence, weak rule of law, human rights violation 
 Social Welfare: lack of social services (such as medical services, potable 
water, and sanitation; underdevelopment of infrastructure, such as roads 
and schools) 
 Economic: lack of economic opportunities  
An examination of JSOTF-P’s employment of its SOF capabilities shows that the 
SOF capabilities employed do address most of the immediate causes of conflict in the 
Philippines. Over the last ten years, JSOTF-P lines of operations have been Capacity 
Building, Targeted CMO, Information Gathering and Sharing and Information 
Operations.78  While JSOTF-P does not identify fundamental causes and immediate 
causes of conflict of the Philippines, these lines of operations, especially Targeted CMO 
and Capacity Building, have addressed immediate causes of conflict rather than 
fundamental causes of conflict.  For instance, it is reported that 80% of JSOTF-P efforts 
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have been CMOs which reduce insurgent safe haven through creating a better 
environment for the populace and livelihood for former militants, thus improving the 
social welfare and economic functions.79   
From 2007 to 2011, JSOTF-P and the AFP conducted 500 joint CMOs to include 
Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP), Dental Civic Action Program (DENTCAP), 
Engineer Civic Action Program (ENCAP), and Veterinary Civic Action Program 
(VETCAP) to improve the social welfare and economic functions in the conflict affected 
area.  These CMOs have resulted in medical and dental care to over 100,000 patients.  
Also, over 140 infrastructure projects were completed and developed to include, schools, 
roads, medical centers, water wells, and piers.80  Where social welfare and economic 
development is stagnant and non-existent, the AFP, partnered and enabled by JSOTF-P, 
provided social services and energized economic development in the conflict affected 
area.  Also, CMOs have had impact on other immediate causes of conflict.  First, the 
image of the AFP was improved as a competent national security force that provides 
security rather than acting as a tool of repression.81  As AFP units coordinated and set the 
security conditions for numerous CMOs, in the eyes of the local populace, these CMOs 
proved that the AFP was capable and even more powerful than insurgents, and was 
committed to improving their livelihood.82  As the security function improved, doctors, 
teachers, government organizations and non-government organizations were allowed to 
return and further improved the social welfare and economic functions in the conflict 
affected area.83  Second, the legitimacy of the GRP was bolstered and the insurgent 
narrative was delegitimized in the eyes of population who were susceptible to insurgent 
narrative.  Thus, the population rejected the insurgent narrative.  AFP Psychological 
Operations teams advised and assisted by MIST, disseminated results of CMOs through 
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mass media platforms, such as newspaper, posters, leaflets, radio and television, 
countering insurgent narratives.84  Third, through the interaction with the local populace 
during these CMOs, better intelligence was gathered, which helped the AFP to separate 
the insurgents from the populace, mitigating any chance of human rights abuse and 
collateral damages.85  While conducting CMOs, AFP units and SF teams often 
interviewed and engaged the local populace to assess atmospherics and to gather 
intelligence on insurgent activities.  Lastly, civil military cooperation with local 
authorities, such as police and local government officials, promoted the primacy of the 
rule of law and interaction between military and civilian organizations.  More recently, 
this increased interaction and cooperation resulted in Joint Task Force Zamboanga-
Basilan, a civil-military fusion center.86  This organization places the PNP at the front in 
order to strengthen the rule of law and civilian primacy.   
While CMOs mainly improved the social welfare and economic functions, 
Capacity Building improved the political and security functions, specifically addressing 
extrajudicial killing, human rights violations and armed violence.  Through persistent and 
habitual engagement with tactical units to higher headquarters, JSOTF-P assisted the AFP 
to be more proficient and professionalized.87  This effort has helped the AFP to consider 
the population as the center of gravity.88  This change in perspective resulted in a 
decrease in human rights violations and extrajudicial killings by the AFP.89  Also, armed 
violence decreased as the AFP focused on separating the insurgents from the populace 
through CMOs and intelligence driven operations.90   
Interestingly, how and why JSOTF-P addresses immediate causes of conflict 
seems to be due to restrictions imposed by bilateral agreements drawn between the U.S. 
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and the GRP.  This agreement, known as Visiting Force Agreement, restricts JSOTF-P 
from conducting direct combat operations.91  Ironically, this restriction is an enabler and 
force multiplier as JSOTF-P is forced to allocate scarce resources to non-kinetic and non-
combat related operations, such as CMOs and Philippine Security Forces (PSF) capacity 
building, for providing a secure environment for the populace in the conflict affected 
area.  For over 40 years, the AFP was focused on direct combat operations aimed at 
insurgent groups.  However, these efforts only offered a short term fix, and addressed a 
small portion of the immediate causes for conflict.  Direct combat operations often 
produced civilian casualties and collateral damage, which bred grievances and 
exacerbated insurgencies.92   
In recent years, the AFP published the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) – 
Bayanihan, which outlines a Whole of Nation Approach and People Centered Security / 
Human Security Approach to Philippines internal security problem caused by conflict.  
Its strategy is to pursue peace and security through empowering other government 
agencies and providing protection, respect for human rights, good governance, social 
welfare and economic opportunities, aimed at improving the four core functions expected 
of a state.93  This recent strategic change in the GRP’s approach to conflict is a result 
JSOTF-P’s persistent engagement with its AFP partners.94   
A recent 2011 Congressional Research report stated that ASG strength and 
leadership has greatly diminished in the Southern Philippines since the Philippines and 
U.S. began joint military operations.95 This is an indicator that SOF employment which 
addresses the immediate causes of conflict is working.  Conversely, it can be argued that 
the reduction in ASG strength in the Southern Philippines is a direct result of increased 
capacity and capability of the PSF, enabled by JSOTF-P, to conduct surgical kinetic 
operations aimed at the ASG leadership rather than addressing immediate causes of 
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conflict.  These kinetic operations, which only address armed violence, have been quite 
successful.  It is reported that by 2010 only a half of a dozen out of 24 original ASG 
leaders remain at large.96  However, these kinetic operations are only a small part of a 
larger PSF effort in addressing causes of conflict.97  Without addressing the social 
welfare, political and economic functions, the PSF could not have been able to garner 
population support and critical intelligence to specifically target ASG leadership among 
the local populace.  For example, in 2007, a local on Jolo, impressed by AFP CMOs, 
which showed that the PSF was committed to improving the livelihood of the population, 
provided a valuable intelligence which led to the capture of an ASG leader Abu 
Solaiman, a high value individual.98  Thus, increased kinetic capability cannot be argued 
as the only reason for reduction of ASG strength in the Southern Philippines.    
2. SOF Employment Must Be SOF-Centric  
The employment of SOF capabilities by JSOTF-P fits the characteristic of SOF-
centric employment.  Its approach is indirect, non-kinetic, host nation led, flat 
organizational structure and small footprint.  As mentioned previously, JSOTF-P is 
restricted from conducting direct combat operations which forces JSOTF-P to be indirect 
in its approach.  Also, the importance of sustaining GRP and U.S. legitimacy has forced 
JSOTF-P to provide and employ more non-kinetic support to the AFP.  Since the 
beginning of OEF-P, JSOTF-P has consistently ensured that the AFP was upfront in 
every operation, and JSOTF-P acts in a supporting role.99  For instance, numerous CMOs 
such as MEDCAP, VETCAP, ENCAP, and DENTCAP are coordinated through the AFP 
and conducted with the AFP.  Also, JSOTF-P has instituted a “Rewards for Justice” 
program that offers bounties for wanted terrorists as means of indirect and non-kinetic 
approach to targeting terrorists in support of the AFP operations.100   
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At strategic and operational level, JSOTF-P is a flatter organization with small 
footprint compared to conventional army headquarters.  Also, its three Task Forces are 
organized in flatter organizational structure to give SOF teams more flexibility and 
authority to make quick decisions and bottom-up planning, which is vital to a SOF-
centric approach.  At the tactical level, SOF teams, who are trained regional experts, can 
manage and operate on their own, with little guidance and supervision. This means teams 
can assume a flatter organizational structure.  These SOF teams known as LCEs, ranging 
from two to ten personnel are dispersed and embedded with partnered AFP units.  Also, 
due to their dispersion throughout Joint Operations Area (JOA), these LCEs are given 
flexible authority to conduct FID and assistance operations within the JSOTF-P’s 
mission, lines of operations and guidelines.  See Figure 6.  Moreover, a force cap of 
approximately 600 personnel on JSOTF-P constrains its foot print in the Philippines.  Its 
composition and the wide disposition of its forces throughout the Philippines within the 
AFP bases ensure that JSOTF-P forces are protected.101   
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Figure 6.  JSOTF-P Joint Operations Area102 
3. Interagency Cooperation Must Be Coordinated by SOF 
As the only U.S. military entity in the Southern Philippines, JSOTF-P is at the 
center of interagency cooperation as JSOTF-P, through its partnered AFP units and local 
government officials, has access to semi-permissive and restricted areas of the conflict 
affected areas in the Southern Philippines.  JSOTF-P and the U.S. Embassy Country 
Team have a strong relationship and meet on a weekly basis to integrate and synchronize 
their efforts and plans.103  JSOTF-P maintains liaison with multiple interagency 
                                                 
102 Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines, “Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines 
Fact Sheet,” JSOTF-P (blog). 
103 Beaudette, “JSOTF-P Uses Whole of Nation Approach to Bring Stability to the Philippines,” 12. 
 41 
organizations, such as USAID, Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Treasury, 
Department of State (DOS), United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  Working closely with these organizations, 
JSOTF-P is able to leverage greater resources in mitigating immediate causes of conflict.  
As a result of this cooperation, JSOTF-P coordinated with USDA agricultural seminars in 
Sulu and Mindanao, conflict affected areas.  These seminars are designed to give 
practical advice on farming and veterinary techniques.  The seminars also brought 
provincial and national assets to the local government to increase greater participation 
and sponsorship in the conflict-affected areas.104  Through coordination with the U.S. 
Embassy and the U.S. Navy, JSOTF-P coordinated regular visits of the U.S. Navy 
hospital ship Mercy, which has provided medical care to tens of thousands of 
Filipinos.105 Cooperative effort of JSOTF-P and DOJ’s International Criminal 
Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) has resulted in training of over 
1600 local police officers in the conflict affect area of Sulu Island by ICITAP.106  These 
efforts strengthens rule of law, limits extrajudicial killing, and human rights violations by 
the AFP and the police, which directly deals with the immediate causes of conflict.107   
USAID, coordinating with JSOTF-P, has brought millions of dollars worth of projects to 
conflict-affected areas.108  JSOTF-P has been taking a lead role on the ground in 
interagency cooperation in the conflict affected area because of its freedom of movement 
in this semi-permissive environment and access to these areas.  Also, due to its habitual 
relationship with local PSF and humanitarian capabilities, such as disaster response, 
JSOTF-P is at the center of gravity to foster most efficient and effect interagency 
cooperation.109  However, it seemed that JSOTF-P’s ability to coordinate interagency 
cooperation is limited to tactical and operational level success within its JOA as its 
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footprint is limited to the JOA.  Also, U.S. Embassy Country Team has been the lead in 
the overall interagency cooperation in the Philippines beyond the scope and range of 
JSOTF-P’s capabilities.110  Consequently, it is clear that JSOTF-P is not the lead in 
interagency cooperation but a support.  However, interagency cooperation in the 
Philippines is effective as JSOTF-P’s on the ground experience and the capabilities of its 
assets are well coordinated with the Country Teams through weekly coordination and full 
time liaison in the Embassy.111    
G. SUMMARY  
Although the Philippines is not a rapidly failing state, it has experienced a great 
deal of instability in recent years. In addition, its instability has direct implications on the 
U.S. strategic interests in the region.  This case study identified three fundamental causes 
of conflict which are religious division, socio-economic inequality and the culture of 
corruption.  This case study also identified immediate causes of conflict categorized by 
four core functions expected of a state.  Both fundamental and immediate causes of 
conflict leave the populace susceptible to an insurgent narrative, thus perpetuating the 
cycle of conflict.  However, assuming that the fundamental causes of conflict cannot be 
effectively addressed by SOF capabilities, this case study examined how SOF capabilities 
were employed to address the immediate causes of conflict.  The examination has shown 
that by design and conscious effort by JSOTF-P, JSOTF-P has employed SOF 
capabilities which are focused on CMOs to address the immediate causes of conflict.  
Also, JSOTF-P’s application of SOF capabilities is SOF-centric in that SOF capabilities 
are employed indirectly, by, with and through the PSF, with the PSF in the lead.  The 
JSOTF-P organizational structure resembles a flat organization despite its military 
organizational structure in that its small SOF teams are empowered and guided through 
distinct JSOTF-P’s lines of operations and its mission statement.  JSOTF-P’s small 
footprint, through embedding and effective partnership, has lowered visibility of U.S. 
military presence to a minimum in the highly politically sensitivity environment and 
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neutralized the perception of occupying forces.  As the only U.S. military organization in 
the Philippines, JSOTF-P has been at the center of gravity for interagency cooperation, 
especially in the conflict affect area due to its access and close partnership with host 
nation forces.  Although, JSOTF-P is supporting the overall U.S. Embassy Country 
Team’s initiative in the Southern Philippines,112 JSOTF-P greatly leveraged resources 
and applied interagency cooperation as a force multiplier to its SOF capabilities.  JSOTF-
P, having close ties with PSF units, is the choice partnership by Non-Government 
Organizations and Other Government Agencies for the proper selection and distribution 
of aid within the conflict affected areas.  Overall, SOF employment in the Philippines has 
been effective.  This conclusion is supported by further analysis of significant activities 
(SIGACTs), which is comprised of insurgent attacks to include armed clash, shooting, 
bombing, abduction, ambush, and raid, in Basilan and Sulu from 2001 – 2008.  Figure 7 
shows a decrease in SIGACTs from 2001-2006, when SOF were employed in Basilan, 
and an increase in SIGACTs from 2006-2008, when they had been redeployed from 
Basilan to Sulu. Likewise, Figure 8 shows an increase in SIGACTs from 2002-2005 in 
Sulu, before SOF were deployed there, and a decrease in SIGACTs from 2006-2008 
when SOF were deployed in Sulu. Moreover, though JSOTF-P relocated its forces from 
Basilan to Sulu, the AFP and PNP continued their presence in Basilan.  Thus, reduction 
of level of conflict can be attributed to SOF employment in Basilan.      
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Figure 7.  Basilan Significant Activities by Insurgents113 
 
Figure 8.  Basilan Significant Activities by Insurgents114 
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IV. COLOMBIA CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Colombia has been marred by two persistent security threats:  the cultivation, 
processing, and global distribution of cocaine, and the long-standing existence of at least 
two significant guerrilla movements within its borders.  The Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN) were 
designated as terrorist organizations by the U.S. in 1997.115  For over 50 years, the 
presence of terrorist organizations and the cocaine trade not only contributed to the 
conflict in Colombia, but have been a cause of concern for the United States for two 
reasons.  First, the United States and Europe account for 80% of global cocaine 
consumption originating from Colombia.116  According to the U.S. Department of 
Justice, “the illicit drug trafficking and abuse of drugs present a challenging dynamic 
threat to the United States.”117  Second, the cause of Colombia’s conflict associated with 
terrorist organizations spills over to the neighboring countries, which can threaten 
regional stability.  The porous borders between Colombia and its neighbors facilitate 
movement, safe haven, and criminal activities for terrorist groups.118  Hence, Colombia’s 
internal conflict and its influence on neighboring countries add to the cause of concern 
for the United States.  Since 2000, Colombia has received nearly $7 billion in U.S. aid, 
which is the largest amount received amongst any other countries in the Americas.119  
Military assistance, consisting of training and equipment, contributed the most towards 
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the overall amount of this aid, which has been persistent.  This case study will focus on 
the last two decades of military assistance to Colombia, specifically SOF employment, to 
determine its effectiveness by examining the following: fundamental and immediate 
causes of conflict, SOF employment, and three variables pertaining to our hypothesis.  
B. FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES OF CONFLICT 
This case study focuses on Colombia’s three prevalent fundamental causes of 
conflict.  These fundamental causes are weak governance, social inequality, and the 
industrial level of coca cultivation.120  These root causes are so deeply intertwined that 
they form arguably a wicked problem.121  Colombia’s weak governance not only creates 
a permissive environment for terrorism, but it creates a vacuum of authority which these 
terrorists fill with their own authority.122  The social inequality between the “haves” and 
“have-nots” not only exists in terms of wealth distribution, but also in terms of political 
representation.  As a result, political power and representation is consolidated within the 
elites, which further segregates the populace, and creates opportunity for alternative 
political representation through terrorist organizations.  The coca cultivation in Colombia 
has long been a part of its history, but became a more prevalent issue as a cause of 
conflict as the global demands increased, and it became an illicit parallel economic 
structure.  Consequently, the terrorist and paramilitary organizations took advantage of 
this attractive source of income to maintain a consistent flow of resources to bolster their 
respective organizations.  Furthermore, this lucrative parallel economic structure has not 
contributed to national GDP, but rather promoted illicit agricultural alternatives to 
peasant farmers.  
Historically, the government ceded control over many of the rural areas that the 
terrorist organizations currently control, and the culture of violence dates back to the 
                                                 
120 Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and 
Its Implications for Regional Stability, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001), 2.   
121 Nancy Roberts, “Wicked Problems and Network Approaches to Resolution,” International Public 
Management Review 1, no. 1 (February 2013), 1. 
122 William O’Neill, “Responding to Terrorism: What Role for the United Nations,” International 
Peace Academy Conference Report,” (New York, NY: International Peace Institute, 2013), 9, 
http://www.ipacademy.org/media/pdf/publications/conference_report_terr.pdf. 
 47 
initial ideological split between Colombia’s two dominant political parties.123  The 
Conservatives favored an authoritarian and centralized government, while the Liberals 
advocated a decentralized and federalist government.  However, the majority of the 
actual violence occurred amongst peasants in the rural areas serving as proxies for the 
political parties.  What began as a difference in ideas, quickly led to a state of undeclared 
civil war and was considered one of the most violent eras of Colombian history, which is 
known as La Violencia and claimed over 300,000 lives from 1946 to 1958.124  
Eventually, the two parties agreed to alternate the presidency every four years so that 
each party had equal opportunity for political representation, and thus ending this period 
of violence.  This pacification, known as The National Front, brought unity among the 
political parties; but the government continued to neglect the rural areas.  As a result, 
armed conflict and violence persisted among the various groups of people in the rural 
areas, and government legitimacy continued to deteriorate as rule of law was established 
and enforced locally by terrorists in the absence of government authority.  The absence of 
government authority in the rural areas creates power vacuums where the terrorists and 
paramilitary organizations establish their own governing authorities.125  For instance, 
Colombia’s terrorist and paramilitary organizations reached 622 out of 1050 
municipalities (townships) in the mid-1990s.126  Additionally, the FARC and ELN 
controlled approximately 30–35 percent of the national territory of Colombia between 
1999 and 2008.127   
Colombia’s weak governance in the rural areas continued to segregate the 
population which increased social inequality.  Following the National Front, the interest 
of workers and peasants continued to be neglected resulting in sharp decline of living 
conditions.128  Colombia’s current Gini coefficient of 58.5 ranks in the bottom 10 in 
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terms of its income inequality, and Colombia has maintained this consistently low 
ranking over the past two decades.129  According to a statement made by the head of 
UN’s Economic Commission for Latin American and Caribbean office in Bogota, the 
depth of social inequality will induce people to resort to non-institutional means of 
collective action such as violence.130   
Colombia’s social inequality was most prevalent in the rural areas.  It is in these 
same areas where Manuel Marulanda Vélez organized the FARC.  With the limitation of 
political power and representation imposed by the government, Marulanda Vélez, who 
was a former peasant, aligned with the Liberal Party during La Violencia. He adopted 
communism, and united with other like-minded individuals.  The government attempted 
to eradicate this group, rather than find ways to resolve the social gap.  This eradication 
effort resulted in the dispersion of these individuals rather than their eradication. The 
fighters eventually united under the leadership of Marulanda Vélez and created the 
FARC.  Similarly, ELN’s roots can be traced back to the disparity in social classes 
around the same time period.  The government’s initial attempt to neutralize these 
guerillas led to the training of civilians by the military and police, which became the basis 
of the initial paramilitary organizations.  The creation of these terrorist organizations, as a 
result of social inequality, has incited more violence, persistent armed conflict, and 
human rights violations.   
Colombia’s coca cultivation was initially small scale and part of common peasant 
farming, which began in an ideal climate and geography of the Andean Regions.  
However, it became a fundamental cause of conflict with the introduction of chemical 
processing, resulting in the industrialization of a highly addictive narcotic commonly 
referred to as cocaine.  This fundamental cause was further exacerbated by the decline in 
coffee prices and increasing global demands which allowed this lucrative economic 
opportunity to transform into an illegitimate economic structure.  The majority of the 
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areas where most of the coca cultivation is transformed into illegal narcotics are under the 
control of various terrorist and criminal organizations.131  Some of the immediate causes 
of conflict stemming from this fundamental cause are persistent violence as well as 
human rights violations.  For instance, drug traffickers exploit children by using them as 
distributors to target schools in order to expand the internal drug market in Colombia.132  
This form of child labor leads to recruitment of other children as drug users and 
traffickers.  Ultimately, this illicit economic structure only benefits the terrorist, and does 
not contribute to the overall economy of Colombia.  
C. IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF CONFLICT 
The immediate causes of Colombia’s conflict stem from the fundamental causes 
and are categorized below, based on the four core functions expected of a state:   
 Political: armed political oppositions (FARC, ELN, paramilitary) 
 Security: armed violence, kidnappings, human rights violations  
 Social Welfare: lack of social services    
 Economic: narcotics (illicit economic structure) 
The armed political oppositions to the existing government are responsible for the 
immediate causes of conflict consisting of armed violence, human rights violations, and 
kidnappings.  These immediate causes threaten the livelihood of the populace and 
consistently threaten Colombia’s security function.  Colombian government’s inability to 
effectively address these immediate causes of conflict within its sovereign territories 
creates a security vacuum.  This security vacuum provides freedom of movement and 
activities to terrorists which allows for the continuation of armed violence, crime, and 
illicit activities.  According to Rand, “the response of governments in Bogotá to the 
state’s weakness has been to conciliate, negotiate with, or, if possible, ignore challengers, 
rather than to try to impose its authority.”133  The persistent violence, as a result of the 
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Colombian government’s inability to provide security to all of its citizens, has become 
part of everyday life, and has a direct impact on the life expectancy of the populace.134  
The importance of security has been recognized even by the government, and it prompted 
former Colombian President Uribe to implement Democratic Security Policy, “to regain 
control of the country by increasing the numbers and capacity of troops and police units 
and by deploying them across the country to challenge the guerrillas.”135   
D. SOF CAPABILITIES EMPLOYED: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND 
ORGANIZATION 
This case study focuses on SOF engagements in Colombia over the last two 
decades and analyzes it into two parts: Pre 9/11 and post 9/11.  In the 1990s, the SOF 
footprint was relatively large, and the mission was limited to counter-narcotic efforts.  At 
the time, the majority of SOF in Colombia consisted of 7
th
 Special Forces Group 
personnel.136  The 7
th
 Special Forces Group’s efforts provided training and assistance to 
the newly established Colombian Counter Narcotics Brigade (BACNA) from the late 
1990s into the early 2000s.137  During this period, augmented SF companies rotated out 
every 90 days to train different battalions.  MISTs maintained a similar presence as the 
SF teams, but were smaller in their overall number of personnel.  The MISTs, also known 
as Psychological Operations Support Elements (PSE), initially began with three operators 
in 1990.  Their initial mission was to support the United States Embassy in Bogota and 
the Plan Colombia, and was limited to counter narcotics efforts.138  Civil Affairs have 
also maintained consistency of its missions throughout the years since the 1990s, 
supporting U.S. and Colombian national objectives.     
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The post 9/11 era for SOF in Colombia is characterized largely by change in 
authority and strategy. The signing of National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 18 
by President George W. Bush, allowed more flexibility to train Colombian military for 
the purpose of targeting terrorist groups.  Prior to the signing of NSPD 18, Special Forces 
soldiers were limited to assisting Colombia for the purposes of counter narcotics.  In 
2002, the role of SOF expanded to countering terrorism and insurgencies in addition to its 
initial role of counter narcotics.  To support this expanded authority, the number of MIST 
personnel grew to 12 in order to support both the old counter narcotic mission as well as 
assist in the new mission of targeting terrorists for the Colombian military.  An example 
of executing this expanded authority is demonstrated through MIST supported and 
Colombian government led campaigns against high-value targets such as former FARC 
leader Alfonso Cano.  MIST assisted in developing products such as the leaflet in Figure 
9 to encourage the populace to report any information related to the location of this high-
value target.  As a result, information derived from the citizens helped locate Cano and 
eventually this high value individual was killed in 2011.139  The expanded authority 
granted after 9/11 allowed MISTs to be more flexible with regards to their ability to focus 
efforts on terrorists, which allowed them to provide more active support to the Colombian 
military under the authority of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).   
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Figure 9.  Leaflet Used in the Campaign to Locate Alfonso Cano140      
Civil Affairs operations in Colombia continued to support the Foreign Internal 
Defense and Counterinsurgency missions, and further legitimized Colombian institutions 
to gain and maintain a positive opinion of the target population.  An example of CA 
effort in support of the Colombian institutions is the Surgical Civic Action Program 
(SURGCAP) which took place in a small remote town of La Macarena in April 2012.  
The Colombian military put together this event to bring attention to remote residents who 
lacked medical service, and with the help from U.S. CA Soldiers as well as the Bogota 
based NGO medical organization, Patrulla Aerea Civil Colombiana (PAC), this event 
resulted in more than 1000 Colombian citizens receiving free medical care and general 
surgery services.141  With the authority and money to assist the host nation to target 
terrorist groups, elements of 7
th
 Special Forces continued their efforts to train, advise, and 
assist the Colombian military and police.  In 2006, for example, elements of 7
th
 Special 
Forces worked with Colombian SOF consisting of Battallon Comando (BACOA) and the 
Agrupacion Lanceros (Lanceros) as well as Colombian National Police’s (CNP) 
Carabinerors and Junglas as part of their mission to train, advise, and assist.142    
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E. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
1. SOF Employment Must Address Immediate Causes of Conflict 
 Political: armed political oppositions (FARC, ELN, paramilitary) 
 Security: armed violence, human rights violations, persistent violence 
 Social Welfare: lack of social services    
 Economic: narcotics (illicit economic structure) 
SOF employment in Colombia has been persistent over the past two decades, and 
to some degree it addressed all immediate causes of conflict that are identified in this 
case study.  In fact, based on limited data on SOF employment in Colombia over the last 
two decades, SOF has focused on the eradication and interdiction of narcotics, terrorists, 
and the provision of social welfare.  Narcotics as an illicit source of revenue provide 
resources to the terrorists and continue the armed political opposition and violence.  
Therefore, addressing narcotics can reduce the source of terrorist revenue and indirectly 
impact their operations by disrupting the source of the resource.  For example, the U.S. 
trained BACNA formed the first of Colombia’s joint forces with other Colombian units 
as part of large-scale aerial eradication in the Putumayo and Caqueta departments.143  
These efforts resulted in decline of total coca cultivation from 169,800 hectares in 2001 
to 144,450 in 2002 according to U.S. government figures.144   
Terrorists are primarily responsible for the armed conflict, human rights 
violations, and persistent violence.  Mitigating terrorists directly impacts security by 
reducing armed conflict, human rights violations, and persistent violence.  Prior to 9/11, 
SOF efforts were limited to counter-narcotics until the strategy expanded to address 
security issues in 2002 with the signing of NSPD 18 by President George W. Bush.  For 
example, the SF support to increase security along the Arauca Oil Pipeline occurred 
immediately after NSPD 18 was approved.  Figure 10 reflects decrease in terrorist attacks 
on Colombian infrastructure, to include oil pipelines, as a result of increase in security 
efforts since 2002.  According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, SF 
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provided training and equipment for about 1,600 Colombian Army soldiers to improve 
their ability to act quickly in minimizing terrorist attacks along the Cano Limon 
pipeline.145  As a result, attacks decreased in Arauca, but more attacks occurred in the 
neighboring Department of Norte de Santander where the Colombian Army brigade has 
not received U.S. security training.146  In 2006, the Colombian led Humanitarian 
Demobilization program, supported by U.S. Embassy’s Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS), 
resulted in an average of one guerrilla turning himself in every three hours from summer 
to the end of year to the local police or army, of which 56 percent came from the 
FARC.147  The leaflets produced by MIST in support of the Humanitarian 
Demobilization program contributed to at least 290 FARC members demobilizing.148  
     
Figure 10.  Acts of Terrorism in Colombia (Infrastructure)149      
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The lack of social services may not seem as important as other immediate causes 
of conflict, but nonetheless it still contributes.  The social services are based on needs of 
the populace and if terrorists provide these needs as opposed to the government, it 
increases their legitimacy which can impact their recruiting and support base from the 
population.  With the help of CA teams, more host nation led efforts are being made to 
address lack of social services in the periphery.  CA provides much needed supplies and 
expertise to the existing Colombian government apparatuses, and the rest of the efforts 
are executed by, with, or through the host nation.  The CA efforts are transparent 
“through the integration of Colombian forces, police, civilian government agencies, 
NGOs, doctors, and engineers, to plan, coordinate and execute operations facilitated by 
the civil affairs team.”150  For example, the transparent CA efforts led by Colombia have 
occurred in the following areas, which had previously lacked a government presence: San 
Jose del Guaviare, Solano, and Fusagasuga.  In Guaviare, the capital of Guaviare 
department, which borders the former demilitarized zone for the FARC, medical 
readiness training exercise (MEDRETE) was conducted, and as a result, more than 800 
consultations were provided to the populace covering general medical, optometry, 
orthopedics, audiology, vaccinations, general dentistry and orthodontics.151  In Solano, 
both MEDRETE and surgical readiness training exercise (SURGRETE) were conducted 
to over 826 patients.152  As a result, 826 minor surgeries along with 560 optometric 
evaluations and 6670 other specialty consults were performed.153  In Fusagasuga, 
MEDRETE provided healthcare to over 1030 patients with medicines and eyeglasses.154 
These Colombian-led CA efforts are significant because it impacted the populace in 
regions not previously affected by the Colombian government.    
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2. SOF Employment Must Be SOF-Centric 
Due to limitation on the number of U.S. military personnel authorized in 
Colombia, as well as the capabilities that Colombia already possesses, SOF-centric 
operations fit ideally to support Colombia, and therefore SOF employment has been 
SOF-centric.  As stated in Chapter II, SOF-centric is defined by the following 
characteristics:  indirect, host nation led, flat organization, small footprint, and generally 
non-kinetic operations.  Colombia serves as an example of success through an indirect 
approach to assist the host nation.  The initial efforts of SOF in the 1960s can be summed 
up by the following statement from the Strategic Studies Institute in 2002,  
Also notable is that U.S. policymakers resisted the temptation to 
“Americanize” Colombia’s conflict through the introduction of Special 
Forces combat teams directly onto the battlefield. Unlike Vietnam, 
decision makers pursued an indirect policy that played to America’s 
strengths: economic and military aid, training of security forces, technical 
assistance, and logistical and intelligence support. Not only did this policy 
prove judicious from a domestic political standpoint, it ensured Colombian 
solutions to Colombian problems…155  
This statement emphasizes the importance of working by, with, and through the 
host nation to ensure that host nation takes ownership of the problems, as well as the 
solutions.  This indirect approach allows the host nation to receive necessary assistance to 
lead all efforts and reinforce the idea of host nation led solutions to resolve host nation 
problems.  Thus, every effort of SOF in Colombia is host nation led.  For example, the 
efforts of the C2 element, Special Operations Command Forward (SOCFWD), served a 
critical role in providing on-site coordination to the host nation government and military 
under Operation Willing Spirit (OWS) which resulted in a successful hostage rescue in 
2008.156  SOCFWD was a small element which provided indirect support through the 
host nation and its role was indirect in nature which allowed the host nation to execute 
the actual hostage rescue.  The Washington Post reported in 2008, “Colombia's military 
yesterday rescued the most prominent of several hundred hostages…a group of 15 that 
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included the French-Colombian politician Ingrid Betancourt and three American Defense 
Department contractors who had been imprisoned in remote jungle camps since 2003.”157   
The U.S. SOF in Colombia work directly with the host nation government and 
military at both the tactical and operational level, and SOF’s organizational structure and 
characteristics allow this type of flexibility as oppose to a non SOF element.  The lateral 
authority and flexibility to work with the host nation military, police, and U.S. embassy’s 
Narcotics Affairs Section implies that more responsibility and flexibility is given to each 
individual and/or units at the lowest level because of unique inherent capabilities of SOF.  
One of the inherent capabilities of SOF is to operate in small numbers.  The initial 
support to Plan Colombia in 2000 saw a force cap (ceilings), which limited the number of 
U.S. military and civilian contract personnel.  The nature of SOF task organization is 
small compared to the conventional unit equivalent, and this limitation, as well as the 
added limitation of downsizing the existing SOF footprint to support GWOT efforts in 
the Middle East, further prevented SOF from establishing a relatively large footprint.  In 
the case of Colombia, the small SOF footprint, paired with increases in host nation 
military footprint, contributed in maintaining host nation led efforts.  Although the small 
footprint may have its limitations, it is less intrusive and forces the host nation to build up 
its capabilities.  The reduced SOF footprint maximized its effectiveness through training 
the trainer within the Colombian military and police to build host nation capabilities.  The 
effectiveness of the host nation capabilities in improving security is reflected in Figures 
11 and 12.  In addition to working in small numbers, MISO and CA efforts are purely 
non-kinetic in nature since many of their efforts are centered on the host nation populace.  
In Colombia this holds true since MISO focuses on disseminating information and 
messages to the populace through available mediums while CA assists host nation 
apparatuses with supplies and expertise to improve social welfare amongst the populace.  
                                                 




Figure 11.  Total Number of Kidnappings in Colombia158  
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Figure 12.  Collective Homicide Numbers in Colombia159    
3. Interagency Cooperation Must Be Coordinated by SOF 
Although there are traces of interagency cooperation in Colombia, it has not been 
coordinated by SOF.  There are habitual working relationships between SOF and 
interagency within the U.S. embassy, but there are also differing focus of efforts between 
the military and other non-military agencies which makes it difficult for any 
coordination.  In the past the military’s primary focus was the FARC, and agencies like 
the NAS within the U.S. embassy focused solely on the drug related problems, whereas 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was concentrating on 
development.160  However, even though SOF has not coordinated interagency 
cooperation, all agencies have adopted a whole of government approach where differing 
views come together to produce a concerted effort.  The U.S. government agencies in 
Colombia hold synchronization meetings to ensure that all efforts are transparent to one 
another and allow synchronization of efforts, which continues through today.161   
                                                 
 159 Ministerio de Defensa Nacionál, Logros de la Politica Integral, 11.  
 160 Burton, “ARSOF in Colombia,” 27. 
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F. SUMMARY 
Modern day Colombia is not a failing state, but has seen a great deal of instability 
from deriving from persistent conflicts.  In addition, its strategic importance as a key US 
partner and ally in South America makes the stability of Colombia a priority for the 
United States. This case study identified three fundamental causes of conflict which are 
weak governance, social inequality, and culture of coca cultivation.  This case study also 
identified immediate causes of conflict which are armed political oppositions, armed 
violence, kidnappings, human rights violations, lack of social services, income inequality, 
and narco-trafficking.  Independently, these immediate causes of conflict may not 
threaten the stability of Colombia, but the aggregate effect of these immediate causes 
leaves the populace susceptible to terrorists and paramilitary influence and vulnerable to 
violence.  Much of the credit should be given to the Colombian government for 
identifying the causes of conflict and applying the proper strategy to mitigate them.  
However, SOF has played a vital role in assisting Colombia to mitigate the immediate 
causes of conflict and allowing the host nation government to lead and build on successes 
to progress forward in improving its overall security, especially in the periphery.  Any 
SOF presence visible to the locals is temporary and always in the presence of host nation 
representatives.  The unique environment of Colombia where U.S. military efforts are 
limited to providing equipment, training, advising, and assisting naturally favors the less 
intrusive SOF-centric approach regardless of whether the unit is SOF or conventional.  
The conventional forces assigned to U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) also 
provide assistance to Colombia in a similar manner as SOF due to the restrictions placed 
on all U.S. military assistance.  As seen in this case study, an effective way to empower 
the host nation government apparatus is through partnerships and providing the necessary 
assistance, but ultimately putting the face of the host nation on every effort.   
In the 1990s, the strategy revolved around counter-narcotics for the Colombian 
and U.S. governments, which impacted SOF employment and utilization.  However, the 
shift in strategy after 9/11, addressed improving the security through targeting terrorists 
as an organization as well as individuals in addition to the original counter-narcotics 
missions.  Additionally, Colombia implemented the Democratic Security and Defense 
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Policy under President Uribe where the Colombian government also shifted its strategy to 
address security issues while counter-narcotic missions remained ongoing.  These 
strategy shifts have resulted in improvement in overall security over the last decade and 
continues to maintain its effectiveness.  Although much of the credit should be given to 
Colombia for implementing effective measures to improve security, SOF employment, as 
well as other non SOF employments under USSOUTHCOM, played a key role in 
providing training and equipment to Colombian armed forces which increased the 
effectiveness of the supported units and its associated operations in eradicating the 
sources which produce the immediate causes of conflict which threaten Colombia’s 
security.     
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V. AFGHANISTAN CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary Afghanistan has been consistently ranked among the top 10 failed 
states by a number of failed state indexes.162  Afghanistan is challenged with addressing 
threats jeopardizing its overall stability.  The U.S. and Coalition forces presently assisting 
Afghanistan have been addressing many of the fundamental issues threatening 
Afghanistan’s stability since the signing of its Constitution in 2004.  This case study is 
focused on the employment of SOF in Afghanistan and examines the hypotheses to 
determine whether or not SOF capabilities have been effectively employed to mitigate 
causes of conflict. The first section will provide a brief overview of Afghan history, as 
well as review the specific definitions and principles that outline the scope of the case 
study.  The second section will review both fundamental and immediate causes of 
conflict in Afghanistan. This section will also provide a brief overview of SOF and 
conventional force employment in Afghanistan from 2001 to present.  The third section 
will examine the hypotheses of the thesis against actual examples of SOF employment in 
Afghanistan.  Overall, the argument of this case study is that SOF units eventually 
figured out how to mitigate immediate causes of conflict through the application of a 
SOF-centric methodology and effective interagency cooperation.  
B. BACKGROUND   
The U.S. and Afghanistan’s political relationship began in the 1930s after the 
former recognized Afghanistan’s independence from Great Britain, which had treated the 
Emirate of Afghanistan as a tributary polity rather than a formal colony since the 1890s 
or so.163  Following World War II, Afghanistan vied for support from both the U.S. and 
                                                 
162 Several reputable indexes are published which measure and rank nation-state failure, weakness, 
and fragility; all of which rank Afghanistan within the top ten.  Examples of such are the Fund for Peace 
Failed State Index, Brookings Index of State Weakness in the Developing World, and The World Bank 
Fragile States/Territories. 
163 “A Guide To The United States’ History of Recognition, Diplomatic, And Consular Relations, By 
Country, Since 1776: Afghanistan,” U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, accessed January 15, 
2013, http//history.state.gov/countries/Afghanistan. 
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the Soviet Union.  It regularly accepted foreign assistance and the establishment of many 
basic services and infrastructure, such as roads and schools.  In the 1950s, U.S. 
agricultural experts went to Afghanistan to develop its agronomic potential. Currently, 
agriculture is eighty percent of Afghanistan’s economic income.  However, most farms 
produce anything beyond the subsistence level.   
During the years of Soviet occupation in the 1980s, the U.S. assisted anti-Soviet 
Afghan fighters through covert operations and other methods.164  Following the Soviet 
withdrawal in 1989 and the collapse of the Afghan Interim Government in 1992, a civil 
war ensued.  In 1993, Pakistani military dictator Zia ul-Haq worked with Arabs, 
Pakistani, and Afghans to galvanize a violent movement that led to the formation of the 
Taliban, which later concurred most of Afghanistan until late 2001.165  Following the Al 
Qaeda terrorist attacks in 2001, U.S. forces returned to Afghanistan to topple the Taliban, 
which was providing asylum for the terrorist and Al Qaeda leader, Osama Bin Laden. 
 In the beginning, the mission in Afghanistan was straightforward: overthrow the 
Taliban regime and capture or kill Osama Bin Laden.  It quickly grew more complex 
after U.S. leaders established a policy of nation building.166  There were several courses 
of action to consider when determining the factors that should be addressed to stabilize 
the country.  The variables the Department of Defense considered when planning a 
campaign coincided with doctrinal components often used by military planners, yet 
destabilizing factors found in Afghanistan were not clearly identified.  A culture of 
corruption, economic turmoil, and influence from warlords merely touched the surface 
regarding some causes of conflict in Afghanistan.  Clearly, there existed fundamental 
reasons for conflict that an intervening organization would be challenged with 
reconciling if Afghanistan were to successfully progress as a functioning nation-state.  
                                                 
164 “A Guide To The United States’ History Of Recognition, Diplomatic, And Consular Relations, By 
Country, Since 1776: Afghanistan.”   
165 Zalmay Kahlilzad, Prospects for the Afghan Interim Government, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
1991); “Taliban,” Oxford Islamic Studies Online, accessed  January 17, 2013, 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2325?_hi=34&_pos=4.  
166 Peter Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures 
of Great Powers, (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2011), 630. 
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C. FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES OF CONFLICT 
Numerous fundamental causes of conflict exist in Afghanistan.  This case study 
has identified three recurring causes, which are consistently addressed in literature 
regarding Afghanistan.  They are corruption enabled by poor governance, poverty and 
economic underdevelopment, and foreign intervention.  The first fundamental cause for 
conflict in Afghanistan is corruption enabled by poor governance.  “Corruption is widely 
understood to be the improper use of a public or official position for private gain.”167  
“Bad governance is associated with corruption, distortion of government budgets, 
inequitable growth, social exclusion, and lack of trust in authorities.”168  Of course, 
corruption is only one form of government failure, but because of the severity of 
corruption in Afghanistan, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
(GIRoA) has created an inherent divide between the government and the population.  As 
a result, a general lack of confidence in the Afghan government exists, which perpetuates 
a belief that all those in the government’s employ are corrupt and not trustworthy.  
Sentiments such as these degrade the GIRoA in its ability to demonstrate legitimacy, 
which is important to U.S. national strategy and interest.  An example of such a 
circumstance is discussed in an article appearing in the January 2013 Afghanistan 
Review.  It suggests Afghan government officials are defrauding society by living 
exorbitant life styles and are lining their own pockets with other people’s money.169  
Instances such as these create vacuums of power, which produce wide divisions between 
social classes, and further delegitimize the GIRoA.  According to Transparency 
International, Afghanistan is ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in the world, 
                                                 
167 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Corruption in Afghanistan: Recent patterns and 
trends—Findings,” (Vienna, Austria: UNODC, December 2010), 3. 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Corruption_in_Afghanistan_FINAL.pdf. 
168 “Corruption and Governance,” The World Bank Group, accessed March 10, 2013, 
http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/1f3aa35cab9dea4f85256a77004e4ef4/e9ac26bae82d37d685256a
940073f4e9?. 
169 Eray Basar, “Governance and Rule of Law,” Civil Military Fusion Center – Afghanistan Review, 
https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/afg/Documents/Afghanistan_Review/CFC_Afghanistan-Review-
15Jan13_final.pdf, “According to the lawmaker Shukria Barekzai, the rents of the two deputies for their 
homes and guest houses are approximately USD 12,000 a month. Moreover, they are also billing their 
office, security and guest house expenses to the government, totaling up to USD one million annually.  
Barekzai also said that high level officials are building their residences by using the state budget despite 
that the presidential office allocated adequate money for such construction,” (January, 15 2013). 
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along with North Korea and Somalia.
170
  The culture of corruption in Afghanistan has 
had profound impacts on the poor, hindering the country’s economic growth; which 
reflects poorly on government leadership, and encourages support for the insurgency.   
Corruption in Afghanistan impacts many levels of government and society, from 
the street cop extorting passers-by at a traffic check point, to senior leadership positions 
held in the Ministry of the Interior.171  According to the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), “Corruption is principally a failure of governance.”172  The political 
environment has not experienced relative long term low levels of conflict since the 40 
year reign of its last democratic Monarch, Zahir Shah, which ended in 1973.
173
  Since 
then, Afghanistan has seen a high turnover rate in its political leadership, each of which 
held varying strategies for Afghan governance.   
The second fundamental cause for conflict is poverty and economic 
underdevelopment.  Several contributing variables perpetuate poverty as well: abuse of 
power and armed conflict are simply two of them.174 The CIA ranks unemployment in 
Afghanistan at 183 out of 201 countries.  According to The World Bank, Afghanistan is 
rated 160 out of 183 countries in its ability to facilitate business.  It is also ranked 183 for 
its ability to protect investments.
175
  This suggests that attracting foreign and internal 
investment remains a challenging issue for Afghanistan.  In combination with an 
extremely high illiteracy rate, inadequate land ownership and dependence on livestock, 
                                                 
170 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2012,” Transparency International, accessed April 15, 2013, 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012 Afghanistan is ranked the lowest, along with N. Korea and Somalia. 
171 Ernest Leonardo and Lawrence Robertson, Assessment of Corruption in Afghanistan, United States 
Agency for International Development-Afghanistan, (Washington DC: USAID, January 15 – March 1, 
2009) 4, 8. 
172 United Nations Development Programme, Primer on Corruption And Development, Corruption 
and Development: Anti-Corruption Interventions for Poverty Reduction, Realization of the MDGs and 
Promoting Sustainable Development, Democratic Governance Group, (New York, NY: December 2008), 
9. 
173 Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan,” 103–105. 
174 Anthony Cordesman and Adam Mausner, “Agriculture, Food, and Poverty in Afghanistan,” Center 
For Strategic & International Studies, (Washington DC: CSIS, 2013), 
http://csis.org/publication/agriculture-food-and-poverty-afghanistan. 
175 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, “Doing Business,” (Washington DC: 
The World Bank, 2012), 6. 
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much of Afghanistan remains unemployed, living in poverty, relying primarily on 
subsistence farming for survival.
176
  Attempting to overcome this challenge however, 
Afghanistan has consistently depended on foreign assistance in order to contribute to its 
annual GDP.  “The country is highly aid dependent with foreign aid disbursements of 47 
percent of GDP in 2008/09.”177  Presently, the U.S. and Coalition forces are assisting 
with the enhancement of security in Afghanistan, which is conducive for foreign and 
internal investment.  However, balancing security and commerce can be a double edged 
sword because many of the security measures that have been established, such as check 
points, building barriers, and conducting raids often hinder commerce and potentially 
damage the economy.
178
   
A third contributor to a fundamental cause for conflict is foreign intervention.  
While Afghanistan’s economy has long relied on external support in order to provide for 
its people, as exemplified in the establishment of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, which 
appropriated funds and military assistance advisory groups, foreign occupation has 
sparked intense resistance movements179 In turn, these resistance movements often 
become armed militant groups after foreign occupying forces are driven out. These 
remnants of armed resistance persistently threaten political and social stability in 
Afghanistan.  This case study defines foreign intervention as actions of one or more 
states, which alter the internal affairs of another state, against the will of the affected 
state.180  Since the 1950s, Afghanistan has seen a relatively high turnover in its 
governmental institutions, which were largely supported by either Russia or the United 
                                                 
176 Library of Congress, “Country Profile: Afghanistan,”  (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 
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2011), 519. 
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States.  In the rural areas outside governmental influence, warlords controlled large spans 
of territory, which created power vacuums and took political sway from governed 
areas.
181
  Following King Mohammed Zahir Shah’s rule from 1933 to 1973, Afghanistan 
has seen numerous instances of foreign intervention.182  As a result, the people of 
Afghanistan have suffered oppressive hardships at the hands of foreign occupiers.  In 
contemporary Afghanistan, this case study argues that foreign intervention has 
delegitimized the GIRoA because the current administration can potentially be seen as a 
dependent state, having a puppet government, which provides incentive for government 
opposition groups.     
D. IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF CONFLICT   
This case study identified four immediate causes of conflict, which stem from the 
fundamental causes, and are listed below.   
 Political: Delegitimization of the Government, and Political 
Assassinations  
 Security: Warlordism, Collateral Damage, and Weak Rule of Law 
 Social Welfare: Poor social services (Health and Education) 
 Economic: Weak economic infrastructure 
As in many weak and failing states, a weak political system and lack of security 
are two of the largest factors contributing to conflict.    Afghanistan is no different.  Since 
2002, efforts have been made to shape, clear, hold and build development to improve 
Afghanistan’s social welfare.  However, the Afghan government repeatedly contends 
with challenges against its authority.  For example, insurgent forces delegitimize the 
GIRoA by exploiting religious, social, political and tribal ties through the use of 
propaganda and select acts of violence.
183
  Afghan President Hamid Karzai vehemently 
                                                 
181 Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan, 347.  
182 For a clearly articulated, well written and in-depth history of Afghanistan, read “Peter Tomsen, The 
Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers, (New 
York, NY: Public Affairs, 2011). 
183 Stephen Carter and Kate Clark, No Shortcut to Stability: Justice, Politics and Insurgency in 
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stressed a need to uphold safety for the Afghan people.184  His argument stemmed from 
U.S., International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), and Afghan National Security 
Forces (ANSF) combat operations, which sometimes had inflicted collateral damage onto 
innocent civilians when targeting insurgents.  Political assassinations by the Taliban 
destabilized the Afghan government, as was demonstrated when recent political leaders 
were killed, to include the mayor of Kandahar, Ghulam Haidar Hameedi; a northern 
police commander, Gen. Daud; and President Karzai’s half-brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, 
a key southern powerbroker.
185
  Incidents such as these further fueled insurgency 
propaganda and expanded the division between the people and the state.  The GIRoA 
recognized this failure in state building, and in an attempt to improve the increasing 
levels of conflict through increased security, it drastically increased its military and 
police forces throughout Afghanistan.  ANSF numbers grew from an originally planned 
70,000 to its current strength of 352,000.
186
  GIRoA officials plan to eventually downsize 
to 228,500, and by mid-2013 ANSF forces are expected to secure all of Afghanistan, as 
ISAF draws down to prepare for withdrawal.
187
 
Security is the most significant variable influencing the levels of conflict, as it is 
intertwined with all the other variables affecting conflict.  Because of a lack of security, 
political representation is undermined in many areas of Afghanistan by warlords who 
control areas that ANSF and ISAF forces cannot yet hold or influence.  Anemic rule of 
law threatens the levels of conflict because of the shortage of effective security.  
“Afghanistan’s justice system remains weak and compromised, and a large proportion of 
the population relies instead on traditional justice mechanisms, and sometimes Taliban 
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courts, for dispute resolution.”188  Alternatively, occurring in most of the Afghan rural 
areas, are informal justice systems, structured to be more restorative than retributive; 
which are aimed at promoting communal harmony, rather than prosecuting violators of 
perceived laws.189  Human rights abuses are endemic within this traditional justice 
system, where children are sometimes bartered to other families to satisfy conflict 
resolution, despite this practice being outlawed.
190
   
Last, a lack of basic services, such as access to schools, health clinics, and roads 
to promote economic trade and growth also exacerbate Afghan political, security, and 
economic stability.  Even though, since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, social welfare in 
Afghanistan has improved and the number of basic services provided to Afghan people 
has increased, the GIRoA continues to struggle with establishing enough institutions to 
account for the vast numbers of people not living near urban areas, or major cities.
191
 
In summary, as in many failing states, political legitimacy and effective security 
are the major factors effecting levels of conflict, which directly influence other variables, 
such as economic stability and social welfare.  The GIRoA has experienced a steep 
learning curve since its establishment in 2004, and has struggled with being able to cope 
with numerous factors affecting levels of conflict, such as intervening governments, 
insurgency, and corruption.
192
  The U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense 
play an integral role with assisting the GIRoA and each has worked tirelessly at reducing 
conflict.  However, as the withdrawal of U.S. and Coalition forces draws closer, 
understanding how to address immediate causes of conflict is essential because, quite 
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simply, the GIRoA will be expected to function essentially independent of U.S., ISAF, or 
NATO by 2025.
193
  Until then however, expectations of SOF in Afghanistan have 
increased, and the employment of SOF has become an increasingly popular alternative 
for U.S. military and political decision makers.   
E. SOF CAPABILITIES EMPLOYED: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND 
ORGANIZATION 
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. mission in Afghanistan 
was to eliminate any existing threat to United States or U.S. national security interests.194  
Shortly following Bush’s address to Congress, Paul Wolfowitz recommended the 
employment of SOF in Afghanistan to the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld.  In 
addition to attacking targets associated with Al Qaida and Taliban, SOF was to be used to 
set the conditions necessary for the establishment of a new Afghan Government under 
Operation Enduring Freedom.195  U.S. conventional forces entered theater in 2002 and 
the U.S. and Coalition footprint quickly grew throughout Afghanistan.  SOF and other 
interagency organizations which initially conducted operations freely throughout 
Afghanistan, soon found themselves competing with other U.S. and Coalition 
militaries.196  U.S. troop strength peaked to 100,000 in 2011, following President 
Obama’s surge request, creating a substantially larger U.S. and Coalition footprint than 
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had previously been witnessed.197  From 2001 to the present, the role of SOF in 
Afghanistan changed as U.S. national interests shifted to reinforce its international 
strategic goals. 
During the early phases of the campaign, SOF and Conventional Forces often had 
different goals and focus, which sometimes created problems between commands.198  
Recognizing this dilemma, General Stanley McChrystal was appointed the Commander 
of ISAF (COMISAF) for Afghanistan in 2009.  He changed the focus for SOF operations 
to be more supportive in nature to conventional forces operating in Afghanistan.  He 
reduced SOF kinetic operations, and maximized the reduction of collateral damage being 
afflicted onto the Afghan people by issuing a COMISAF Directive in July 2009.199  
Building the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) became a main 
focus. Theater Rules of Engagement (ROE) were changed as well, restricting the use of 
precision guided munitions in an effort to reduce collateral damage.  Conflicting 
strategies between conventional forces and SOF units were reduced through the standing 
up of the Combined Forces Special Operations Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A), 
where its command relationship with the Commander of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan 
(CDRUSFOR-A) changed from Tactical Control (TACON) to Operational Control 
(OPCON).  In July 2012, the CFSOCC-A restructured its organization to constitute the 
Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan (SOJTF-A).200  It is comprised of all 
the U.S. military branches, as well as 23 other countries, and is focused on improving 
coordination between the U.S. and Afghan government for an enduring and continued 
U.S. presence following 2014.201 
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The organizational restructuring of the CFSOCC-A into the SOJTF-A, enabled 
remotely operating SOF units, who were working with local area governance, to 
synchronize all missions with that of the CDRUSFOR-A, and the ability to problem solve 
increased, at all levels, more effectively.  This flatter organizational structure improved 
information flow as it reduced the degrees of separation between the district, provincial, 
and capital level leadership, and tied the districts to the central government.202  The 
SOJTF-A streamlined the approval process for mission planning by decentralizing 
approval authorities to the battalion level and below, which allowed units to operate more 
effectively in support of the conventional force units who have operational control 
authority for varying areas of responsibility.203  Communications between all units were 
simplified, and planners at all levels were able to coordinate more efficiently with units 
operating in remote areas of Afghanistan.   
Tactically operating SOF units, training and living with ANSF, continued to deal 
with challenges, such as leadership deficits, insider attacks, and limited planning 
capabilities, like logistics.204  Despite these challenges, village level security forces grew 
in 2012 to 88,464 personnel. “Areas of the country influenced by the insurgents and the 
ability of the insurgency to attack the population have been significantly diminished.”205  
Illustrated in Figure 13 below, SIGACTs increased one percent in 2012 for the same 
corresponding month recorded in 2011.  However, since 2010 overall enemy activity has 
declined. ANSF units continue to struggle with challenges associated with fluctuating 
enemy initiated attacks, often attributed to varying annual weather and the harvesting 
of poppy.  
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Figure 13.  Monthly Nationwide SIGACTs (April 2009 – September 2012) 206 
In 2011, SOF units saw increased joint service participation with the integration 
of U.S. Navy SEAL teams and Marine Special Operation Forces (MARSOF), which 
began working for the regionally aligned SOTFs.  Almost all were employed to conduct 
population-centric operations in Afghanistan, with goals to neutralize insurgency, support 
development, and improve governance through the establishment of a secure 
environment.207  However, it remains to be seen whether or not these units were 
successfully employed.  This case study will now examine three variables to determine 
whether or not SOF capabilities have been effectively employed to mitigate causes of 
conflict that threaten Afghanistan stability.  
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F. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
1. SOF Employment Must Address Immediate Causes of Conflict 
As discussed previously, this case study identified immediate causes of conflict 
for Afghanistan, which SOF can potentially influence.  Listed below, these immediate 
causes stem from fundamental causes, and are important to address when assisting the 
Afghan government with stability. 
 Political: Delegitimization of the Government, and Political 
Assassinations  
 Security: Warlordism, Collateral Damage, and Weak Rule of Law 
 Social Welfare: Poor social services (Health and Education) 
 Economic: Weak economic infrastructure 
Employment of SOF capabilities to match the immediate causes of conflict in 
Afghanistan came about after eight years of kinetic operations primarily focused on high 
value targets, which often included former Afghan warlords.208 While the SOJTF-A did 
not specifically identify the aforementioned fundamental and immediate causes of 
conflict, through command directives that issued guidance on the reduction of collateral 
damage, and restructuring of command relationships, SOF transformed its employment to 
better match immediate causes of conflict. 
Two major lines of operation resulted from SOFs attempt to address immediate 
causes of conflict.  They were the establishment of Village Stability Operations (VSO) 
and bolstering of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) to train Afghan Local Police (ALP) and 
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).  VSO is a grass-roots strategy where CA, 
MISO, SF, SEALs, MARSOF, and sometimes Conventional Army security teams 
collectively enter a village, at the villagers’ behest, and establish programs that enhance 
village security and social welfare.  The ultimate goal of the program is to turn the 
responsibility of security in each of the villages back over to Afghan control.209  The 
teams further develop political relationships of the district and provincial leaders through 
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coordination meetings held in the form of Shuras (town meetings) designed to bring 
together the villagers and local area governance.  The teams also increase and improve 
local area security by training the local ALP, which are typically manned at 30 per 
village, and are not authorized to grow larger in number than mandated allocation 
determined by the Afghan Ministry of the Interior (MoI).  District governance is further 
legitimized as insurgent forces are repelled by the village police forces who participate in 
the stability programs.  Figure 14 below reflects all SIGACTs occurring in Afghanistan 
from 2001 to 2011, and it encompasses all U.S. and ISAF efforts to reduce conflict. It 
does not address an exclusive SOF endeavor.  However, studies have shown that enemy 
attacks, or significant activities (SIGACTs) occurring near the vicinity of VSO sites have 
significantly reduced.210 By tracing the pace of SIGACTs, the employment of VSO, and 
the building up of FID, it can be argued that the ANSF, SOJTF-A, and conventional force 
efforts have relatively reduced the levels of conflict in Afghanistan since 2009.211  
Alternatively, it has been argued that severely harsh winters are likely responsible for the 
marked decrease in SIGACTs occurring over the last number of years.212  
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Figure 14.  SIGACTs in Afghanistan Over Time (From Global Terror Database) 
Following the establishment of the Village Stability Coordination Centers 
(VSCC), the communication mechanism changed so that it was less hierarchical in its 
organization, which provided better situational awareness at all levels of command, and 
linked host nation district leaders to provincial leadership through regularly occurring 
Key Leader Engagements (KLEs) and Shuras.213  The meetings would bring together 
tribal elders, district and provincial leaders to discuss pressing matters of concern, and 
illuminated issues that were not known to senior leadership, which often led to 
development projects in areas needing improved social welfare.  Linking the Afghan 
government to development promoted a positive effect on the quality of life for the local 
population, improved infrastructure, and legitimized public opinion between local and 
national levels of government.214  An example of this was seen in Arghandab Province.  
Following the District Governor’s approval and working with local village leadership, 
SOF elements instituted cash-for-work and crops for work projects, which empowered 
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the community and enabled it to promote a more stable environment conducive to 
improving the social welfare and economic core functions.215   
VSO and FID are primarily conducted by SOF units, and each address several 
immediate causes of conflict previously outlined.  The results of such efforts have 
enabled local area government officials to get back into the district centers and begin 
working to reestablish necessary infrastructure, such as clinics and schools.  As a result, 
the legitimacy of the GIRoA has been bolstered in remote areas such as Marjeh and 
Sarkani, which hadn’t seen lawful governance since the Soviet occupation.216  Rule of 
law also improved in these areas.217  SOF addressed the security function most 
effectively by assisting the ANSF units to build their capacity and improve their overall 
capability. 
There are some causes of conflict where SOF has not been able to mitigate as 
effectively.  These causes primarily center on political assassinations, and increasing 
weak economic infrastructure.218  However, through influencing the mitigation of other 
immediate causes, principally security, SOF has demonstrated increasing significance to 
reducing conflict in Afghanistan. 
Several examples exist where social welfare has improved through the 
employment of CA teams by establishing essential infrastructure, such as schools, clinics, 
and roadways.219  MIST teams broadcasted important radio messages, using tactical radio 
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broadcasting systems to reinforce traditional Afghan and Islamic values and also to 
counter insurgent propaganda.220  When combined, SOF in Afghanistan has shown a 
marked reduction in the number of SIGACTs and improved rural area stability, which 
previously functioned as sanctuaries for insurgent commanders who planned and 
prepared attacks against the GIRoA and inflict violence upon the people of 
Afghanistan.221  
2. SOF Employment Must Be SOF-Centric 
With the introduction of conventional forces in 2002, and examples that the 
Taliban were transitioning to an insurgency, experts have argued that the focus of SOF 
should have shifted from stabilization and rebuilding operations to a counterinsurgency 
strategy.222 Opinions for which phase of the operation the U.S. and NATO were in 
differed greatly, which created overlapping efforts, and non-mutually supporting agendas 
between the multiple organizations operating within Afghanistan.223  As a result, 
violence and conflict grew from 2002 to 2009 as U.S. and Coalition forces contended 
with an increasing number of SIGACTs occurring throughout the country.224 
Drawing from lessons learned in Vietnam, and responding to the need for a 
different strategy that was previously heavily reliant on SOF kinetic operations, 
beginning in 2009, Civil Affairs Teams (CAT), Military Information Support Teams 
(MIST), and Special Forces (SF) teams moved out of the city-like Forward Operating 
Bases (FOBs) and into rural area villages to stabilize the countryside, one village at a 
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time.225  The name of this SOF-centric program changed as it evolved and adapted to 
fluid problem sets.  Beginning as the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) in 2009, 
the program later changed to the Community Defense Initiative (CDI), which again 
changed to the Local Defense Initiative (LDI).  In August 2010, Afghan President Hamid 
Karzai made a presidential decree under the Afghan Ministry of the Interior, which 
created the current VSO program.226  The most significant difference between VSO and 
the previous programs is that VSO sought village buy-in before deployment of SOF units 
into the rural areas.227  Communities and village officials worked indirectly with SOF 
units.  Each had mutual goals aimed at stabilizing these areas through improved security, 
which was to be established by the ALP.  The CA, MISO, and SF teams maintained a 
much smaller footprint in these villages when compared to the forces occupying the 
larger-manned FOBs.  These SOF units enabled community leaders to govern their own 
areas of influence by indirectly improving security and building the capacity of the ALP.  
When these SOF-centric characteristics are combined, local area development is further 
promoted and governance is bolstered through the improvement of security.228    In 
March 2012, 56 VSO sites were established throughout Afghanistan and were comprised 
of almost 13,000 personnel.229  By September 2012, 73 districts included approximately 
16,400 ALP security forces distributed throughout Afghanistan.230  Figure 15 below, 
illustrates the number of VSO sites that operated amongst 136 authorized districts by 
September 2012.  Over half of the authorized districts were validated by SOF operating 
in the various regions located throughout Afghanistan.  The figure also accounts for 
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conventional units, as indicated by BSO, or Battle Space Owner who operate in a SOF-
Centric manner, and have also stood up ALP forces.  “The decentralized and distributed 
command and control created challenges with logistical sustainment, but because of the 
expeditionary nature of SOF logistical units, the additional force structure and small 
footprint was both operationally and logistically supported by the CJSOTF-A [now the 
SOJTF].”231  According to a December 2012 RAND paper, enemy SIGACTs occurring 
near the VSPs were statistically significantly reduced, which likely resulted from ongoing 
SOF operations in the rural areas.232   
 
Figure 15.  VSO/ALP Sites by District (March 2012)233 
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The reduction in SIGACTs suggests the VSO/ALP program has demonstrated the 
ability to be a successful program by using this SOF-centric approach.  FID training 
conducted to build the capacity and capability of the ALP has reduced conflict and 
improved the overall local area security in greater than 70 areas across Afghanistan.  By 
improving local area security, host nation governing bodies were further legitimized, and 
were better able to influence the other core functions expected of a state.  The relative 
lightly manned SOF units conducting VSO, through generally non-kinetic means, 
indirectly improved security by assisting the ALP; who in turn take the lead in security 
for their villages.   
3. Interagency Cooperation Must Be Coordinated by SOF 
Although a good relationship exists between the SOJTF-A and the multiple 
interagency organizations, this case study could not find instances where the efforts of 
interagency were coordinated solely by SOF.  Despite the significant increase in the 
number of U.S. civilian personnel flowing into Afghanistan since 2009, there is no formal 
coordination between these organizations and SOF.  However, as the drawdown of U.S. 
forces from Afghanistan continues, the likelihood of SOF-Interagency interaction and 
coordination may increase because of decreased accessibility to rural areas that may 
result from a reduced U.S. presence.   
G. SUMMARY  
Transitioning Afghanistan from one of the most failed states in the world to a 
more stabilized one will be a long road for both the Afghan people and foreign 
supporters.  Ultimately, we argue fundamental causes of conflict will require an Afghan 
solution.  Reduction in corruption will likely take generations, but better governance is 
dependent on the eradication of corruption sooner than later.  As long as the economy 
suffers from a lack of opportunity, the leadership of Afghanistan will continue to struggle 
in garnering support for foreign aid.  It is arguable that U.S. and ISAF forces operating in 
Afghanistan are conducting some form of foreign intervention, which resulted in the 
growing insurgency. However, with the introduction of SOF into rural areas of 
Afghanistan, conflict levels occurring near these locations have significantly reduced, 
 83 
which suggests the governing institutions in these areas favor U.S. and ISAF 
involvement.234  Through a reduction in conflict and improved stability since 2009, the 
governing institutions in these areas are further legitimized as a result.   
It is not likely the SOJTF-A will be able to mitigate the fundamental causes of 
conflict, as they are deeply engrained in the Afghan society.  However, other 
organizations exist which strive to strengthen governments, such as the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP).  Alternatively, SOF can influence and mitigate some of 
the immediate causes of conflict, most specifically security.  As the U.S. begins its 
withdrawal from Afghanistan, the SOJTF-A will continue to employ USSOF throughout 
the country.  Because of SOFs relative low cost, small foot-print, capability to mitigate 
immediate causes of conflict, and its ability to synergize organizational efforts aimed at 
addressing complex issues, the significance for SOF employment in Afghanistan will 
likely be a persistent endeavor made for many years to come.   
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VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION  
This chapter will compare and contrast all case studies in order to analyze the 
overall effectiveness of SOF employment in the Philippines, Colombia, and Afghanistan.   
A. ANALYSIS—COMPARING SOF EMPLOYMENT BY CASE STUDY 
Table 1 is a graphic representation of our evaluation and analysis for SOF 
employment in each case study.235 
 











Philippines Good Good Poor Effective 
Colombia Good Good Poor Effective 
Afghanistan Fair Fair Poor Partially 
Effective 
Table 1.   Comparison of Effectiveness of SOF Employment by Case Study 
1. SOF Employment Must Address Immediate Causes of Conflict 
All three case studies have shown that SOF employment addressed most of the 
immediate causes of conflict.  However, it did not address some immediate causes of 
conflict, such as political assassination and political repression in the Philippines and 
Afghanistan.  Political assassination and political repression are serious problems which 
inhibit the political freedom and create an unstable political environment.  However, 
these immediate causes of conflict are politically driven acts that are difficult to properly 
address through a military to military engagement only. Thus, SOF employment did not 
address these particular immediate causes of conflict because SOF predominately 
operates at the operational and tactical level, while having strategic implications.   
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rates effectiveness using poor, fair, and good as descriptors, and levels of effectiveness for SOF 
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SOF employment did address, however, the issue of professionalizing militaries 
to be more legitimate and supportive of their civilian governments by providing an 
environment in which civilian political primacy and rule of law are respected.  As a 
result, extrajudicial killings and human rights violations committed by host nation 
militaries and security forces were reduced during the timeframe SOF was employed, 
which was especially exemplified in the Philippines.  We also determined that SOF 
employment did not specifically address the economic function expected of a state in all 
three case studies. Thus, SOF had limited impact on economic conditions in conflict 
affected areas.  However, where the economic function improved, it was demonstrated 
that SOF employment reduced armed violence and improved the security and social 
welfare functions.  Therefore it is arguable that the improved economic function was a 
byproduct of the improved security and social welfare functions.  SOF employment is by 
nature focused on improving the security function of a state.  However, without 
improving the other functions of a state, such as the political, social welfare 
and economic functions, the improved security function is not sustainable.  Thus, 
SOF employment must employ multiple instruments of national power to address 
as many immediate causes of conflict as permitted by operational environment and 
SOF’s abilities.  
2. SOF Employment Must be SOF-Centric 
All three case studies have shown that SOF employment was relatively SOF-
centric.  In the Philippines, due to limitations imposed by bi-lateral agreement between 
the RP and U.S., SOF employment was entirely SOF centric.  In Colombia, the 
congressional limitation imposed by the U.S. promoted SOF-centric approach to all 
military assistance.  In Afghanistan, SOF employment was partially SOF-centric during 
the beginning phases of the operation.  However, with the introduction of conventional 
forces in 2004, SOF employment shifted to primarily kinetic and FID operations.  In 
2009, the strategic focus changed, and then SOF employment became once again SOF-
centric, which continues through today.  The latest change in SOF employment to be 
more SOF-centric resulted from lessons learned in SOF history that demonstrated 
reduction in the levels of conflict through successful SOF employment.  
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Conducting operations indirectly, through host nation forces, with non-kinetic 
focus, while maintaining a small footprint and flat organizational structure in a non-
permissive environment, presents unique challenges for SOF.  Non-permissive 
environments are typically more dangerous operating environments.  Therefore a SOF-
centric approach may be more difficult to implement in higher intensity conflict areas, 
such as Afghanistan, due force protection and logistic support issues.   Employment of 
SOF must be a deliberate decision made by policy and strategic planners, while keeping 
these challenges in mind.  
3. Interagency Cooperation Must Be Coordinated by SOF 
All three case studies demonstrated some levels of interagency cooperation.  
However, SOF was not the lead in interagency coordination in any case study.  Such 
coordination must occur through the U.S. Embassy.  Due to SOF’s disposition, dispersion 
and unique capabilities, such as language skills, habitual relationships with host nation 
security forces, and cultural awareness and respect garnered over time, in the three 
countries studied, interagency organizations were able to gain better access to areas 
otherwise inaccessible to most conventional and regular interagency channels.  A viable 
and cooperative relationship existed between SOF and interagency, but SOF was not the 
sole proponent for coordinating interagency efforts.   We also did not find that SOF had 
any significant influence at regulating interagency operations.  However, this does not 
mean SOF is not good at coordinating interagency operations, rather it highlights the 
importance of SOF as a critical link between interagency strategic objectives and 
operational and tactical needs to improve the core functions expected of a state.  In short, 
where U.S. government agencies are the distributor of nation building resources, SOF can 
be an effective tool utilized to disseminate resources in these conflict affected areas.       
4. Overall Effectiveness of SOF Employment  
All three case studies demonstrated SOF employment as having varying degrees 
of effectiveness.  In the Philippines, SOF employment was effective.  In Colombia SOF 
employment was also effective.  However, SOF employment was partially effective in 
Afghanistan.  This partial effectiveness in Afghanistan can be attributed to the change in 
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strategic focus over time.  We recognize the SIGACT data used in this thesis is limited in 
geographic and temporal scope, which postulates an imperfect metric when measuring 
the overall stability in each country studied.  Furthermore, the number of SIGACTs 
changed over time for each of the case studies.  In the Philippines, the number of 
SIGACTs declined where SOF units were employed.  In Colombia, the number of 
SIGACTs declined nationally with the shift in strategy by both the U.S. and Colombia to 
target terrorists in order to improve security.  The efforts of the host nation military and 
police forces outweighed all other efforts, but it can be argued that the effort of SOF in 
building host nation capabilities and targeting terrorists to address security issues 
contributed in some part to the overall decline in SIGACTs.  In Afghanistan, the number 
of SIGACTs relatively steadily increased until VSO and FID began addressing the 
immediate causes of conflict, and SOF began operating in a more SOF-centric nature.  
Therefore, it is arguable that using SIGACT data as a metric to measure the effectiveness 
of SOF employment in each case study is viable.     
B. CONCLUSION 
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review states the following regarding the use of 
smaller U.S. forces and host nation leadership: 
Efforts that use smaller numbers of U.S. forces and emphasize host nation 
leadership are generally preferable to large-scale counterinsurgency 
campaigns. By emphasizing host-nation leadership and employing modest 
numbers of U.S. forces, the United States can sometimes obviate the need 
for larger-scale counterinsurgency campaigns.236 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify how SOF capabilities can be effectively 
employed in order to mitigate conflict in failing and weak states.  Our hypothesis was that 
the effectiveness of SOF employment is dependent on three variables: SOF employment 
must address immediate causes of conflict; SOF employment must be SOF-centric; and 
SOF-led interagency cooperation must be coordinated by SOF.  Before examining these 
variables, each case study identified fundamental and immediate causes of conflict.  By 
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identifying fundamental and immediate causes of conflict, we were able to examine 
whether SOF employment addressed immediate causes of conflict rather than 
fundamental causes of conflict, which are deep rooted and complex problems that need to 
be addressed by the host nation government.  The case studies then examined the two 
remaining variables to determine whether or not SOF employment was SOF-centric and 
if interagency cooperation was coordinated by SOF.  Examination of each variable in 
each case study, allowed us to determine the overall effectiveness of SOF employment 
within each country.  Based on the evidence of the case studies, we have determined the 
following conclusions: 
SOF did not specifically identify fundamental and immediate causes of conflict in 
each case study.  However, SOF employment focused on mitigating the immediate causes 
of conflict. Thus, the overall effectiveness of SOF employment was successful.  More 
importantly, SOF recognized that a symbiotic relationship exists between the security and 
social welfare functions, and therefore also focused on improving the two functions 
simultaneously through host nation security forces capacity building and CMOs focused 
on indigenous populace.  The political and economic functions were strengthened, as a 
byproduct of the improved security and social welfare functions.  
The employment of SOF was most effective when its employment was SOF-
centric.  This variable had the most impact on the overall effectiveness of SOF 
capabilities because the characteristics of a SOF-centric approach highlight the best 
practices outlined in the joint publications regarding COIN, FID, SFA, and stability 
operations.  A SOF-centric approach is built upon the mutual respect of political 
sensitivities between the host nation and U.S. governments, while maintaining the 
obligation to protect the population and sustain popular support, to include the need for 
organizational flexibility for operating in highly complex and unstable low intensity 
conflict environments.   
SOF did not coordinate interagency cooperation in any of the three case studies.  
Therefore, this variable had no impact on the overall effectiveness of SOF employment.  
This is because inherently interagency operations are the responsibility of the Department 
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of State. However, where interagency resources were available, SOF and other agencies 
worked together to reduce immediate causes of conflict in unstable areas.  
Reducing conflict through SOF employment is complex.  The ideas that we have 
presented in this thesis can be applied to SOF employment in FID, SFA, COIN, and 
stability operations.  As discussed in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, there is a 
growing demand for smaller numbers of U.S. forces that emphasize host nation-led 
efforts and indirect U.S. participation.  This approach should be viewed and considered 
for implementation at the strategic level, with specific objectives established before SOF 
employment.  Also, this concept can be applied in assisting foreign militaries, like the 
South Korean military in developing a plan to counter potential insurgency presented by 
the possible collapse of the North Korean regime.  Similarly, this concept can be applied 
to assisting the government of Mali as it addresses problematic insurgency issues.     
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